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I - Abstract 
North Korea is an historical anachronism in the global society of today. This paper presents a 
different approach in analyzing why. North Korea‘s current status can be said to be the result 
of a long line of foreign influence on the Korean peninsula, as well as a strong cultural 
heritage from the Korean and the Confucian tradition. The most influential actor on the 
Korean peninsula has been its immediate neighbour China, which has spread its influence 
over the peninsula from ancient times, up until today, and will also keep exerting its influence 
in the future, politically, economically and militarily. To better understand the North Korean 
state, its society, politics and ideology that continue to confuse and amaze observers and 
analysts, it is crucial to understand the long history of Chinese influence. By analyzing and 
understanding this very special relationship and its development, the North Korean state may 
be better understood and its politics and actions may be better predicted. The development of 
the political relationship between North Korea and China is in this paper analyzed from a 
historical comparative analysis perspective, a political realist perspective and from a 
transitologist perspective. The answers that are being presented are that North Korea is 
becoming more and more dependent on China, at the same time as China tries to distance 
itself from North Korea and solve an internal debate over which direction to take in the future. 
However, the two countries are tangled up in an intricate and delicate web of economic aid 
and assistance, trade and profit, military confrontations and negotiations, and a very special 
form of interdependency. The political choices that one part takes influence the other directly, 
as it has done throughout history and will continue to do in future. This paper explains why, 
how and when these decisions and historical events have done so, what have been their 
results, and what impact they will have on the future. 
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II - Foreword 
I have always been interested in and fascinated by places and things different from us, and 
North Korea is probably one of the most different places in the whole world – from anything. 
The Korean peninsula has been the center of conflict for over 60 years and it is the last 
remains of the Cold War. As a stark contrast to North Korea, China, whose communist state 
was founded at the same time, is the world‘s emerging economic powerhouse. The question 
regarding the future of North Korea is not just a question that is limited to the East Asian 
region; it concerns everyone. North Korea has become a nuclear state and severe instability 
could have unspeakable consequences both militarily, economically and politically. China is 
North Korea‘s closest, if not only ally, and the future of the North Korean state and the 
Korean peninsula depends heavily on this relationship. China is becoming the world‘s leading 
economic powerhouse and any incidents causing a bump to the Chinese economy will be felt 
in the global economy. There is a concern of nuclear proliferation from North Korea which 
would certainly be more acute if something drastic were to change. There is also a very 
delicate power balance in the region which involves almost all of the world‘s greatest military 
powers. This means that the future of North Korea does not just affect China, South Korea, 
Japan and the United States. It could have influence on the whole world, economically, 
militarily and politically. To understand the very special relationship between North Korea 
and China thus becomes important for the whole world. 
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1.0 Introduction 
The East Asian region contains arguably some of the biggest differences between countries in 
the whole world. Ideology, economy, history and military are all completely different from 
country to country. In just about any statistics or any sort of comparable area China, Japan, 
North and South Korea are completely different. Japan is losing its economic hegemony to 
China, North Korea has the world‘s third largest army while Japan only have some forces for 
self-defence, at the same time as another ―Korean Wave‖ of South Korean pop culture 
becomes more and more influential.
1
 
2
 North Korea is in the middle between market-based 
Communist Party rule in China, a comparatively politically liberal Japan, and a former 
authoritarian regime that has turned into a modern and prosperous market economy in South 
Korea. China has lifted 400 million people out of absolute poverty since the 1980s, while 
some estimates show that as many as 10 percent, or even more of the population in North 
Korea starved to death in the late 1990s.
3
 The examples are endless, but the most striking 
feature in all of them is that North Korea stands out as the most different part, and creating 
underlining the huge contrasts within the region. In any comparison, whether it is military, 
ideology, history or economy, North Korea is vastly different from its regional neighbours.  
In this dynamic and diverse region the situation is changing. Japan finds itself in relative 
economic decline, as well does South Korea compared to their neighbour China, which seems 
to be rising to become not just the region‘s but the world‘s new superpower. As China‘s 
powers and responsibilities grow it can no longer concentrate solely on internal politics, 
consumption and harmonious development of the society. Although North Korea‘s collapse 
has been predicted since the early nineties, it seems more and more plausible that the country 
will soon undergo new crises in management, economy and food distribution. China is still 
formally allied to North Korea although they trade and profit tenfold more from South Korea. 
As China seems to further grow and North Korea to further decline, what role will the two 
countries play in relations to each other? 
This paper aims to explore the political relationship between the two countries, and how it has 
developed and changed from the formation of the People‘s Democratic Republic of Korea in 
1949 up and until the rather turbulent year of 2010 that among other things saw the crisis after 
the sinking of the South Korean navy corvette Cheonan (to which North Korea has denied any 
                                                          
1
 CNN. ‗Korean Wave‘ of pop culture sweeps across Asia 
2
 Yu Sang-u 2010 
3
 Noland, Robinson, Wang 2001 
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relation), military drills with South Korea and the U.S, Wikileaks revealing rather unflattering 
descriptions of North Korea by a couple of Chinese diplomats
4
 and the North Korean shelling 
of the South Korean Yeonpyeong island. In addition to this, this paper will also aim to explore 
some other historical incidents that precedes the modern history of the Democratic People‘s 
Republic of Korea‘s state, mainly the Korean contribution to the Chinese anti-Japanese 
guerrilla warfare in Manchuria and the problems it brought along with it in the 1930s, and to 
which extent this has had any effect on policymaking in modern North Korea.  
China is today the only ally and the only significant ―friend‖ North Korea has left in the world 
and China is often described as having, or being, the ―key‖ to ―unlock‖ North Korea. Beijing 
undoubtedly holds some leverage over Pyongyang, but to what extent is unclear to outsiders, 
and one might even suspect that it is somewhat unclear for Beijing and maybe even for 
Pyongyang too! To try to understand North Korean politics it is therefore necessary to try to 
understand its relationship to China and if it really is as it may seem. It is also important to try 
to understand the relationship from China‘s point of view, and finally it is important to have a 
historical perspective on the political relationship between the two. As repetitive as it may 
sound, it is important to know history to understand the present. This thesis is not going to go 
overboard in its historical approach, but rather include it as an important element in a larger 
approach – a method that sadly seems to be lacking in most approaches to North Korean 
politics, economy and society today.  
In short, the main question that this paper raises is: How does North Korea see China and how 
does China see North Korea and what governs their opinions? What has changed and what 
remains the same and what can be expected to happen in the foreseeable future? 
1.1 Research question - The political relationship between China and North Korea 
Most of the research on North Korea that is being done outside East Asia today is in English 
and is naturally concerned with topics regarding North Korea‘s relations with the United 
States and how North Korea influences American foreign policy. The other big contributor to 
research on North Korea is of course South Korea, and it is concerned with the relationship 
between the North and South. China is, despite its booming economy and rapid rise still a 
one-party state with a lot of restrictions on what can be said and written and especially on 
what can be published. Therefore it is hard to obtain most of the Chinese thinking about North 
Korea that no doubt exists. North Korea is of course one of the world‘s, if not the world‘s, 
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most despotic country and any official information released is not to be trusted blindly. This 
may very well be the same for the official information given from any other state. However, 
the factor that makes the North Korean official information especially unreliable is that it is 
the only source of information, hence there are no opportunities to compare it to see if it is 
actually plausible or not. As a result of these factors there is not much published research on 
the relationship between North Korea and China. 
Because of this, I believe that the best approach to explaining the relationship between China 
and North Korea today, is to look at their historical relationship and attempt to use it as an  
explanatory tool. Of course, history is not a blueprint for the future, but I hope that my 
contribution to the research on the political relationship between China and North Korea will 
contribute in some form to increased understanding of the situation, as my contribution will 
hopefully help to expand the scope of the more traditional approach. One can not explain 
North Korea and China just through political analysis, talking about buffer states, human 
rights violations and nuclearization. Including a historical perspective in this analysis will 
hopefully increase the understanding of key aspects of in the relationship and help give some 
answers to questions that today seem hard to answer. These are questions like: Why does not 
North Korea simply just reform like China did? Why is North Korea so reluctant to take 
Chinese advice, especially on military issues and why does North Korea openly defy China in 
several of these cases? I believe that questions like these may be answered just as well by 
using history as a guide, as well as by any other more traditional theoretical approach.  
The research question consists of two main questions and the first one is: 
How can the development of the political relationship between North Korea and 
China be explained? 
This question has several other, smaller questions that are meant to contribute answer the two 
main questions more precisely and in depth. These questions are: 
- Which parts of the development can be explained by which different theoretical 
approaches? 
- How has the relationship developed in the different historical circumstances? 
- Why has it developed? / Or has it really developed at all? 
 4 
 
This paper aims to answer all of these questions although maybe not to answer each one of 
them equally thorough. Finally, taking the answers from these questions, I can ask and answer 
the second main question that this paper raises: 
Based on the historical relationship, how can the relationship be expected to 
develop in the near future? 
Writing about the political relationship between North Korea and China is problematic in 
many ways, but one problem that is maybe not as clear as the others is actually the most 
prominent of them all: What is actually a political relationship? Finding a definition for a 
political relationship is hard. A political relationship is obviously a relationship of a political 
nature or a relationship in politics, etc., but finding a definition for the word relationship is 
also hard. A ―relationship‖ is a very vague and imprecise term. Nonetheless it is a common 
conception that the political relationship between two countries is a very precise and concrete 
thing. This was my very thought, but after having spent a long time pondering what a 
―political relationship‖ really is and most important of all – how to do research on it, I found 
no answer or exact definition. Therefore I had to make my own definition of what a ―political 
relationship‖ between two countries is: 
―The political relationship between two countries is the sum of all political actions 
taken by both actors that will influence the other actor.‖  
In this paper I will look at the most prominent and influential of these political actions and use 
them as the base to answer the research questions. 
1.2 Why is this important? 
The question is interesting from an academic point of view because, as mentioned above, the 
relationship between North Korea and China seems to be neglected, or if not neglected at least 
under-represented in favour of research on the relationships between North Korea and the 
United States, or North Korea and South Korea. The relationship between China and North 
Korea is probably just as important for peace and development on the Korean peninsula as 
that of North Korea and the United States. (As long as it does not come to a second Korean 
War.) 
The question is also interesting from a social point of view because extended research on this 
question could have impact on the actual political and social situation. This is not to say that I 
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neither believe, nor aim for this thesis to create peace on the Korean peninsula, but extended 
research on this topic may lead to a more complex view and ultimately in a different approach 
by media and researchers from a Western perspective. Another reason why the question is 
interesting from a social point of view is that the relationship between North Korea and China 
is changing, and when something is changing, new questions arise and need to be addressed. 
An increased emphasis on the historical relationship will make it easier to predict the key 
aspects of the relationship in the future. 
It is also important because, as mentioned earlier, the explanations being presented today are 
lacking in explanatory power. Focus on brinkmanship, nuclear proliferation and human rights 
alone does not explain the intricate relationship between the two countries or North Korea 
itself. An attempt to explain especially North Korea, but also China from Western modes of 
social science theories, based on Western history, is bound to miss certain aspects. I will 
discuss this more thoroughly in the chapter about my theoretical approach.  
This paper will explore the changes in the political relationships between North Korea and 
China, based not just from the North Korean perspective, but on both countries‘ approaches. 
How has China‘s approach to North Korea changed and how has North Korea‘s approach to 
China changed? 
1.3 The existing research on Sino-North Korean relations 
This paper aims to present a different approach in analyzing North Korea by looking at the 
historical development of the political relationship between North Korea and China. Most of 
the existing research on this relationship today is mainly concerned with either of two 
approaches: The first one is the current development of the economic relationship, as for 
example portrayed by for example Haggard and Noland‘s research on the North Korean black 
markets,
5
 Nicholas Eberstadt‘s book on the North Korean economy,6 and Christopher D. 
Hale‘s assessment of the North Korean ―market‖ reforms.7 
The other main approach to analyzing the relationship is applying the theories of political 
science and analyzing the two countries‘ foreign relations strategies, security, military 
capabilities and nuclear proliferation, like for example Selig S. Harrison‘s book from 2002: 
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 Haggard, Noland 2007, 2009 
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 Hale 2005 
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―Korean Endgame‖ that focuses on different scenarios for the possible future or fall of the 
North Korean state.
8
 
Another article like this is David Shambaugh‘s ―China and the Korean peninsula: Playing for 
the long term‖, from 2003 that was published in The Washington Quarterly.9 In it, he presents 
―China‘s endgame‖ and China‘s supposedly six main goals for the future of the Sino-North 
Korean relationship. 
A similar approach is presented by Anne Wu, also in the Washington Quarterly in her paper: 
―What China Whispers to North Korea‖, from 2005 where she presents ―the five main 
messages‖ that China is trying give North Korea regarding how China believes North Korea 
should manage its foreign policy.
10
  
In a monograph published by the Strategic Studies Institute in 2004, Dr. Andrew Scobell 
analyzes the relationship and includes a brief background explanation based on the historical, 
military and geopolitical relationship between the two countries.
11
 This explanation is 
however only brief and does not provide any answers for the further analysis of the 
relationship. Hongkoo Han presents a historical explanation for some of the North Korean 
political structure in his PhD thesis from the University of Washington entitled: ―Wounded 
Nationalism: The Minsaengdan Incident and Kim Il Sung in Eastern Manchuria‖.12 However, 
he does not describe any later historical incidents than the Minsaengdan incident. 
Thus, I hope and believe that this paper will contribute to a widening of the traditional scope, 
by adding detailed background information of the development of the historical development 
of the political relationship between China and North Korea and thus presenting a different 
approach to the analysis of this very special relationship. 
This paper consists of three main parts – the first part describing the historical relationship 
between Korea and China before 1949, with special emphasis on the Minsaengdan 
(Minshengdan in Chinese) incident and on the Korean contribution to the anti-Japanese 
struggle in Manchuria in the 1930s. The second part will emphasise the first part of the 
modern relationship between North Korea and China after North Korea was founded in 1949 
and up until 2000. The third part will focus on the recent historical development from 2000 to 
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2010 and will thus be a natural entrance to the following analysis. Only selected parts will be 
emphasised as the scope of this paper is not to be a historical account, but I still hope that as 
little as possible if anything of vital historical information is omitted. The analysis will be of 
the historical and the modern relationship, comparing them up against each other, but also 
viewing them in their own light in order to determine how the relationship has progressed and 
in the end how it is plausible that it will continue to develop. 
To recap, the two main questions that this thesis seeks to answer are: 
How can the development of the political relationship between North Korea and 
China be explained? 
And 
Based on the historical development, how can the relationship be expected to 
develop in the near future? 
2.0 Approach 
2.1 Theoretical approach and theoretical problems 
This thesis will consist mainly of a comparative historical analysis approach, but will also 
apply some elements of the International Relations school of theories, as well as the study of 
transitology. I hope that that the combination of these three theoretical approaches, although 
contrasting, may complement each other and together form a solid foundation that this thesis 
may be written upon. The comparative historical analysis is in many ways the exact opposite 
of the International Relations approach, or any other approach in the social sciences. This is 
because that where International Relations theories strives to apply theories to describe the 
real world (or in some instances apply the real world to describe their theories), comparative 
historical analysis is more centered on causal analysis. However, both theories seek to explain 
and predict the same events in the same world. Therefore, I will not argue that one theoretical 
approach is better than the other, but rather attempt to see what can be explained by the 
different approaches and to which degree they may complement each other. Another 
theoretical approach that could be applied, as a supplement, is the theory of transitology.
13
 
14
 
Transitology is the comparative research on former Soviet states and the political and 
                                                          
13
 Tőkés 2000 
14
 Gans-Morse 2007 
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economical changes that contributed to their change. The theory could be applied in the way 
of looking at what political and economic changes have taken place in China and what 
changes, if any, have taken place in North Korea. Then the focus could be shifted onto the 
pre-requisites for these changes in the two countries and what in the end separated them. The 
point of comparison could be the gradual decline, or death of Maoism in China and the degree 
of the same phenomena (as described by historian Andrei Lankov in his paper from 2006 
entitled ―The Natural Death of North Korean Stalinism)15 in North Korea.  
Regarding the theoretical approach, I begin with a description of comparative historical 
analysis: In their book ―Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences‖, Jones 
Mahoney and Dietrich Reuschmeyer give a good introduction to the features of comparative 
historical analysis: Comparative historical analysis is concerned with causal analysis and an 
emphasis on historical processes over time that combined leads to ―systematic and 
contextualized comparison.‖16  
The main critics of this approach is according to Mahoney and Reuschmeyer ―among those 
who seek universalizing knowledge‖ because historically theorizing methods has too many 
limitations. This is acknowledged by Mahoney and Reuschmeyer to a degree, but it is also 
pointed out that they don‘t have the same ambitions of their counterparts in constructing 
flawless theories that can be applied any given place at any given time. They argue that 
comparative historical analysis is necessary because of the limitations of universalizing 
theoretical approaches and because the causal approach is much more thorough and have 
much more explanatory power, even though it can not be applied to other cases other places.
17
 
Studies that aim for universal truths cannot grasp historical details and are vulnerable to them. 
However, the main advantage of the historical comparative approach is that: 
―Historical researchers can comfortably move back and forth between theory and 
history in many iterations of analysis as they formulate new concepts, discover novel 
explanations, and refine pre-existing theoretical expectations in light of detailed case 
evidence.‖18 
To summarize, the comparative historical analysis has the strengths that is the social sciences‘ 
weakness and its weak points are social sciences‘ strength. 
                                                          
15
 Lankov 2006 
16
 Mahoney, Reuschmeyer 2003:6 
17
 Mahoney, Reuschmeyer 2003:9 
18
 Mahoney, Reuschmeyer 2003:13 
 9 
 
The opposite of the approach of comparative historical analysis approach is the approach of 
International Relations theory: According to Øyvind Østerud in his introductory book on 
political analysis ―Innføring i politisk analyse‖, these are the most common schools of thought 
in International Relations theories: 
- Realism, neo-realism, neo-liberalism 
- Global Society, globalization, internationalism  
- Marxism 
- Overlapping perspectives – (As for example the study of International political 
Economy can be both liberal, Marxist and neo-realist.)
19
 
Which  school of thought has the biggest explanatory power to the questions that are being 
asked? Are there other schools of thought that can explain, or at least be complementary to the 
explanation? In this dissertation I will use the classical realist school of thought as my 
theoretical approach and I will explain why: 
The ideas that govern the classical realism school of thought can be traced a long way back in 
history to the likes of Sun Zi in China and Machiavelli in Europe. Thomas Hobbes wrote 
about the ―state of nature‖ in his book Leviathan in the 17th century, which can be read as 
being synonymous with anarchy. The German Hans Morgenthau is reckoned as one of the 
founding fathers of classical realism in the 20
th
 century. The classical realist school is 
according to Østerud defined by the fact that every state is in a constant state of nature to 
acquire more power over other states. This can be explained by the fact that the international 
community of states is anarchic from nature, like the state of nature that is described by 
Hobbes. It can also be explained by the fact that the will to gain more power is derived from 
human instinct and that it governs the states as it governs every individual. These two traits 
can be used as an explanation one by one, or combined together.
20
 They are the two main 
traits that defines the realist school and other schools of International Relations theories 
disregards these traits, to different degrees. 
                                                          
19
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20
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A more thorough introduction to realism is given by James E. Dougherty and Robert L. 
Pfaltzgraff Jr.,
21
 as they in their book ―Contending Theories of International Relations: A  
Comprehensive Survey‖, present the six traits that make up the theoretical foundation that 
political realism is based upon: 
- The states are the main actors in the international community. 
- Their relations are conflictual by nature as they struggle for power. This means that 
every state‘s main goal is survival and that every state is responsible for its own 
survival. (This is a very important point when talking about North Korea as it can be 
argued that North Korea has found itself in a position of constant threats to regime 
survival more or less since it‘s founding in 1949. This will be thoroughly discussed in 
the analysis.) 
- Every state‘s existence is founded upon their own sovereignty. 
- States are unitary actors and foreign policy and domestic policy are not necessarily the 
same. 
- ―States are rational actors.‖ 
- The idea of power and a power struggle is used to explain and predict the actions 
taken by each state.
22
 (However, as I have argued above, this point is contested by the 
historical comparative analysis approach, and it can only explain certain aspects of 
North Korean politics – not all of them.) 
The realist school of thought seems consistent with many of the characteristics of the political 
relationship between North Korea and China as well as the one between North Korea and the 
members of the Six-Party Talks, mainly the United States. This will be discussed in more 
depth in the analysis. From the outside, it looks like it is the best theoretical approach when it 
comes to having explanatory power related to this dissertation. As a temporary hypothesis I 
propose that the comparative historical analysis is more suitable to explain the development of 
North Korea‘s political relationship with China, while the classical realist approach is more 
suited to explain China‘s development of its political relationship with North Korea. This is to 
say that I propose that North Korea has been more affected by historical events regarding their 
policymaking in its relationship to China, than China has been affected by its historical 
relationship with North Korea. However, the situation today may very well be that both North 
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Korea and China are doing politics that can be explained by a political realist approach. A 
hypothesis of today‘s situation may be that China and North Korea are locked in a struggle for 
power and influence over the other part. North Korea wants to profit as much as they can 
from China through political and economical aid without having to follow Chinese advice or 
recommendations, while China wants to exert its influence and control an unpredictable 
neighbour without alienating it.  
2.2 Methodological problems and research methods 
The Chinese approach will have to come primarily from second-hand sources because: There 
is a certain language barrier which makes papers and articles on the subject somewhat 
difficult to find, but mainly because of the fact that China is still a communist state when it 
comes to access and availability of certain information. Also, attempting to ―speculate‖ on 
North Korea‘s future has in the past proven to be difficult. The dissertation will have to be 
strongly objective and unbiased. The data and material used must be accurate, up to date and 
reliable – at least compared to the standards existing when talking about North Korea. (Most 
of which does not possess these standards) However there is information that is more 
unreliable than other. 
Another methodological problem is that it has earlier been shown that it is does not 
necessarily make any sense at all to try to explain North Korea from Western theories. 
Therefore, the International Relations theories and transitology will be employed 
pragmatically and loosely rather than tightly and rigidly. North Korean policies seem to 
continue to baffle observers, and many of the political choices are branded as irrational, 
paranoid or even crazy. These have become the characteristics of the North Korean regime in 
the Western media and even in some of the more academic research on North Korea as well. 
This may well be because of the lacking scope of the theoretical approach that is being used, 
but on the other hand there aren‘t any specific universalizing theoretical school of thought that 
can be seemingly applied to North Korean studies. In my dissertation, the realist and 
transitology approach will presumably be the closest, but it probably won‘t be able to explain 
everything. Therefore, this theoretical approach will be applied rather loosely. This is exactly 
why I want to apply comparative historical analysis: Because it is the only theoretical 
approach that (seemingly) seems to be able to explain the core of North Korean politics, 
because North Korean politics are not governed by the same rules as Western politics or even 
most of the rest of the world. Indeed it is safe to say that it does not follow any other political 
 12 
 
models in modern history, and although it resembles aspects of the Stalinist Soviet Union and 
the Maoist China, it can not be compared with these two because it exceeds them both in 
authoritarianism, the simplicity of the economic policies and in the extremely centralized and 
concentrated political structure. Therefore Western, or any other universal theories, can not be 
applied to North Korea as the sole theoretical approach. History and causal analysis will 
hopefully fill the holes in the theoretical approach when writing about North Korea. 
3.0 The historical relationship until 1949 
3.1 From the Neolithic Period to the end of the Sino-Korean tributary relations 
The Korean peninsula has a long history of Chinese influence and according to the book 
‖Korea Old and New‖, published by the Korea Institute at Harvard University,23 the first 
archeological sign of this influence is the spread of a new pottery culture with painted designs 
that spread from China to Korea around 2,000 years B.C. It marked the advent of the late 
Neolithic period.
24
 The next major influence to come from China was the appearance of rice 
cultivation. This is evidenced by archeological uncovering of tools in Korea used to harvest 
rice – the same tools as the ones that have been found to be used in China. This was during 
the Bronze Age in Korea, which lasted from the ninth or eight century B.C. until around the 
fourth century B.C.
25
 There is a long history of examples like these where several aspects of 
Chinese culture were adapted, including Buddhism, Confucianism and Chinese characters, 
and it is no space in this paper for mentioning all of them. However it can be said that some of 
the earliest Korean sates: Koguryo (37 B.C. – 668 A.D.), Paekche (18 B.C. – 660 A.D) and 
Silla (57 B.C. – 995 A.D.) were all tributaries in some form to different Chinese dynasties. 
The first really significant political relationship mentioned by Eckert is however, the one that 
evolved with the creation of the Chinese Mongol Yuan Dynasty (1271 – 1368) rising to power 
in China and capturing the Korean Koryo Dynasty as a tribute state. 
―Yuan demanded Koryo gold, silver, cloth, grain, ginseng and falcons, and at times 
even young women and eunuchs.‖26 
A later example of the historical relationship can be taken from 1592, when Japanese forces 
landed at Pusan in vast numbers in the spring. The Ming Chinese army came to the Choson 
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Dynasty‘s defence with 50.000 men and won a victory at Haengju early in 1593. In 1597 the 
Japanese launched another attack, but this time the Koreans and the Ming army were prepared 
and the Japanese were unable to conquer the land.
27
 
28
 After the Ming Dynasty in China was 
overtaken by the Manchu Qing Dynasty, the Manchus launched their first invasion on Korea 
in 1627 and the Choson Dynasty eventually assumed the position of tributary state to the Qing 
Dynasty.
29
 In 1894, on July 23 the Sino-Japanese war broke out with Japanese forces seizing 
the Korean royal palace, and the war ended with total victory for Japan on April 17
th
 1895. 
The Qing Dynasty was forced to acknowledge Korea‘s full independence from China (and in 
effect a new dependence for Korea on Japan), and the long tradition of Sino-Korean tributary 
relations was finally broken.
30
  
3.2 Kim Il Sung 
Much of the history of North Korea is the history of Kim Il Sung. In his book: ―North Korea 
Another Country‖ Professor at the University of Chicago Bruce Cumings presents what he 
calls ―The legend of Kim Il Sung.‖ To summarize the ascent to power of North Korea‘s 
―Great Leader‖, The Juche calendar (which is the official North Korean calendar) started on 
April 15
th
 1912 with the birth of Kim Song Ju, later known as Kim Il Sung.
31
 He was born in a 
village close to Pyongyang, joined a Marxist underground group as a youth and was arrested 
by the Japanese. After he got out of prison he joined a guerrilla group, and later joined up 
with Chinese guerrilla groups in Manchuria to fight the Japanese. After the war was over he 
became leader of the Korean People‘s Army (KPA) at its founding on February 8th 1948 and 
one year later he was hailed ―supreme leader‖ at its first anniversary, meaning he was 
officially in charge of the whole country.
32
 This however, was the short story, and much more 
emphasis can be put on Kim Il Sung‘s activities during his participation in guerrilla activities 
against the Japanese in Manchuria in the 1930s. Among one of the most significant incidents 
in the political relationship between China and Korea of this particular time is the 
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Minsaengdan incident, an incident that is seldom mentioned, but one that was researched by 
Hongkoo Han in his PhD thesis from the University of Washington entitled: ‖Wounded 
Nationalism: The Minsaengdan Incident and Kim Il Sung in Eastern Manchuria.‖ To 
conclude, Hongkoo Han argues that it has undoubtedly been pivotal in shaping the North 
Korean state, government and the Juche ideology that has since played a big role in the later 
political relationship between North Korea and China. This is, according to Han, because Kim 
Il Sung and most of the North Korean government were active in the anti-Japanese guerrilla 
struggle in Manchuria and most likely had strong memories from the incident. 
3.3 The Minsaengdan incident 
Leading up to the Minsaengdan incident, the North Korean official biography on Kim Il Sung 
published in 1973 describes the situation for Koreans in Manchuria like this: 
―(…) the enemy took advantage (…) to aggravate relations between Koreans and 
Chinese people by the means of a cunning policy of national estrangement.‖33 
And: 
―The reactionary Chinese warlords and even some Chinese people who did not have a 
clear understanding took a hostile attitude toward the Koreans, branding them as 
―Japanese agents‖. So, many Koreans found it impossible to settle down and carry on 
their activities anywhere.‖34 
According to Cumings, around 80-90 percent of the Chinese Communist Party in Manchuria 
was actually Korean at the time of Japan‘s establishment of Manchukuo. The Minsaengdan, 
Minshengdan (People‘s Livelihood Corps) appeared in late 1931 and was made up of pro-
Japanese Koreans, who were mostly wealthy merchants or businessmen who sympathized 
with the Japanese for different reasons. The Minsaengdan downplayed its connection to Japan 
and called for Korean independence, without taking any hostile stance against Japan. It was 
not very well received by the Chinese Communist Party. Chinese communists and guerillas 
became convinced that the Minsaengdan members had aided Japan in the takeover of 
Manchuria and spied for and collaborated with the Japanese. As a result, any Korean 
suspected of being a member of the Minsaengdan was purged and sometimes even executed. 
Over 1,000 Koreans were expelled from the Party as suspects and between 500 and 2,000 
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Koreans were executed from 1933 to 1936.
35
 Even Kim Il Sung himself was arrested as a 
possible Minsaengdan collaborator, but because of his close ties with the Chinese he was 
freed and faced no charges, as Cumings writes: 
―Kim Il Sung took a leading role in trying to reconstitute Chinese-Korean cooperation 
in the Manchurian guerrilla struggle, in spite of the terrible losses suffered at the hands 
of Chinese racism; his fluency in Chinese and long association with Chinese guerrilla 
leaders certainly helped.‖36 
About the struggle against the Minsaengdan the North Korean official biography contains a 
lengthy description of how Kim Il Sung allegedly single-handedly managed to overcome the 
situation. Among other things he is quoted to have said: 
―The sectarian-flunkeys, with the backing of the national chauvinists, used the anti-
‗Minsaengdan‘ struggle for their own evil sectarian purpose and committed grave 
criminal acts-sacrificing many fine Communists and revolutionaries and creating 
alienation, enmity and distrust within the revolutionary ranks, thereby weakening their 
unity and solidarity.‖37 
―Long before he started his march into north Manchuria, Comrade Kim Il Sung had 
waged a principled struggle against the chauvinists and sectarian-flunkeys who 
schemed to use the struggle against the Minsaengdan for their own selfish ends, and 
who were carrying out this struggle in a leftist way, because they were unable to see 
through the cunning Japanese imperialist policy of estranging Koreans from Chinese 
and their attempts to subvert the revolutionary ranks from within.‖38 
As can be seen, the Chinese are not portrayed in a flattering light, but ultimately it was the 
Japanese that was to blame, as they were the ones responsible for attempting to damage the 
relationship between Koreans and Chinese. This biography was published in 1973 and it is 
obvious that the Minsaengdan incident was very well alive in the collective national memory 
even at that point, around 40 years after it had happened. 
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3.4 Guerilla war and the founding of The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
According to two Japanese Kwantung Army colonels who chased Kim Il Sung in Manchuria 
debriefed during the Korean War:  
―They did not care about the relations of their command organ with the Soviet Army 
or the Chinese Communist (Army).‖ They ran back and forth across the Russian 
border to escape counterinsurgency units, but the Soviets provided no weaponry or 
material aid; instead the guerrillas took weapons, ammunition and other supplies from 
the Japanese armies:‖39 
Kim may have escaped being purged during the Minsaengdan incident, and although he was 
no longer seen as a threat to the Chinese Communist Party, the Koreans were not any safer in 
the eyes of Stalin: 
―As Soviet dissident Roy Medvedev was among the first to point out, during the 
purges of the late 1930s Stalin executed every Korean agent of the Communist 
International he could get his hands on – after all they might be Japanese spies.‖40 
On these grounds Kim Il Sung was again arrested, being accused of collaborating with the 
Japanese, but this time he was arrested by Soviet Russians upon encountering them in 1940, 
after moving into the Soviet territory in search of a safe heaven as the result of intensified 
Japanese suppression. He was released on the conditions that the Korean guerillas stop their 
struggle against Japan so Japan would not turn north and attack the Soviet Union.
41
 This must 
clearly have affected Kim Il Sung and his Korean comrades as Bruce Cumings points out: 
―Is it any wonder that for a Communist arrested by both Chinese and Soviet‖ 
comrades,‖ independence and self-reliance would later become Kim Il Sung‘s 
leitmotiv?‖42 
From 1940 to the end of the war, although Kim Il Sung was a major in active duty in the 
Soviet Red Army, he was stationed in the Soviet Union and played no direct role in the 
liberation of Korea, contrary to the claims of North Korean propaganda. At the end of the war 
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he travelled to North Korea and by the help of Soviet authorities he was gradually instated as 
chief of the armed forces and thus became head of the party and the state. 
Bruce Cumings says in his finishing remarks that Kim Il Sung apparently liked to call himself 
changgun, which means general and is written with the same characters as those used in the 
Japanese word shogun which means warlord. Bruce Cumings also draws parallels from this 
image of Kim Il Sung and his guerrilla companions to the founders of the Choson dynasty and 
the first emperor of the Choson dynasty, Yi Song-gye. He also created a ruling elite by giving 
out land grants and other privileges to the soldiers that helped him ascend to the throne, just 
like Kim Il Sung filled the inner circle of the government with his guerilla comrades. Bruce 
Cumings summarizes the Minsaengdan incident and the Manchurian experience like this: 
All in all, the Manchurian experience is the crucible of North Korean truth, 
storytelling, drama, myth, and hagiography ever since – ―an epic tale of national loss, 
struggle, and ultimate redemption, a metaphor for Korea‘s colonization and 
restoration.‖43 
Hongkoo Han writes in his conclusion that: 
―(…) the wounds that the North Korean leaders suffered in their innermost selves were 
not left by Japanese imperialism alone. Many of the returned guerillas, including Kim 
Il Sung, were deeply wounded by the Minsaengdan Incident. Considering the simple 
mention of pursuing a Korean revolution (independently of a Chinese revolution) 
provided the excuse for execution, it is understandable why Kim and his followers 
adhered so much to the Juche ideology and the independence of the nation when they 
seized power. While North Korean leaders paraded a version of extremely strong 
nationalism, it was a wounded nationalism.‖44 
Archival researcher, professor and historian Balázs Szalontai presents a more contrasting and 
sober view of the historic links between the Choson Dynasty and Kim Il Sung‘s DPRK in his 
book ―Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era – Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North 
Korean Despotism‖: 
―It is all too tempting to draw a parallel between the Democratic People‘s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK) and pre-colonial Korea. Western journalists routinely call North Korea 
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a new ―Hermit Kingdom‖, and some scholars, most notably Cumings, strongly 
emphasize that both the Yi dynasty (1392-1910) and Kim Il Sung‘s regime pursued an 
isolationist foreign policy and laid great stress in ideological orthodoxy. (…) Still the 
heritage of the ―Hermit Kingdom‖ did not necessarily influence the birth of North 
Korean despotism as directly as one might assume. While a post-1945 Korean ruler 
was indeed able to draw inspiration from the pre-colonial past of his country (and Kim 
probably did), he was by no means bound by it.‖45 
Both these views present strong points. However I believe that the historical traditions from 
the Choson dynasty and Korean Confucianism could only have played a limited role in the 
collective memory of the DPRK leaders. It is only natural to assume that these people were 
more affected by the more recent historical events than those events that lay further in the past. 
But still, neither of these two views presents any universal explanation or background to the 
later development of the political relationship with China. For that to be explained, several 
different factors need to be taken into account, and although there are definite parallels 
between the  North Korean state and the Choson Dynasty, and although an isolationist 
ideology towards China can partly be attributed to the Minsaengdan incident, that alone is not 
explanation enough. The events that followed, like for example the Cold War and the Sino-
Soviet split are also vital in understanding the development of the political relationship 
between North Korea and China. 
4.0 The historical relationship: 1949 - 2000 
4.1 The Korean War 
Today it is clear that it was North Korea that started the Korean War by attacking South 
Korea, after direct approval from Stalin to Kim Il Sung (as well as a promise from Mao that 
China would support North Korea militarily if necessary). North Korea quickly conquered 
almost the entire Korean peninsula until the U.S. and the United Nations intervened as a result 
of the absence of the Soviet representative in the United Nations security council. The North 
Koreans were pushed back almost to the Yalu river on the Chinese border until the Chinese 
intervened and the Chinese Peoples Volunteer‘s Army pushed the U.S. back to the 38th 
parallel from which the war had broken out. It then became a trench war that lasted until 1953 
when an armistice was signed. A peace treaty was never signed and the war is thus not 
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technically over. There have also been several small clashes since then between ROK and 
DPRK forces along the border, the latest two in 2010. 
4.2 The Sino-Soviet split and the birth of “Juche” 
According to historian and North Korea expert Andrei Lankov in his book ―From Stalin to 
Kim Il Sung‖, several factors contributed to why North Korea shifted their emphasis and 
reliance from the Soviet Union to China in the 1950s and onwards. The two countries were 
similar in culture and history, at least more so than North Korea and the Soviet Union and 
Kim Il Sung did not like the Soviet de-Stalinization that Khrushchev brought along with him 
– for obvious reasons: Stalin was a dictator just like Kim Il Sung. Additionally North Korea 
and China had close ties through their history of anti-Japanese struggle and guerilla warfare. 
From the late 1950s the DPRK economic managements in many ways followed Chinese 
methods rather than Soviet ones and the Chollima movement can be compared to the Chinese 
Great Leap Forward, although the Chollima movement actually ended up being much more 
successful than its Chinese inspiration. The Chinese slogan of ―relying on own strength‖ is 
also easily comparable to the North Korean ―Juche‖ idea which originated at the same time. 
However, it can be argued that this was only a natural development since both North Korea 
and China were in the early stages of industrialization, unlike the Soviet Union. The concept 
of Juche will be more thoroughly discussed later. In July 1961 Kim Il Sung and Zhou Enlai 
signed a treaty of friendship between the two countries and a week later a similar treaty were 
signed with the Soviet Union. However, after 1962 the DPRK shifted more and more towards 
relying on, and siding with China. Examples of this are that the official North Korean 
newspaper Rodong Sinmun in October 1963 heavily criticized the Soviet position towards 
China. On 27 January the same newspaper denounced Khrushchev for arguing for ―peaceful 
co-existence‖, and the North Korean leadership denounced the Soviet ―capitulation‖ in the 
Cuban missile crisis.
46
 The ―peaceful co-existence‖ was especially difficult for North Korea 
as it was (and theoretically still is) a state founded upon the ambition to dismantle the 
―puppet‖ South Korean regime, remove the U.S. presence and become the legitimate power 
for the whole Korean peninsula. (Although this policy today is unlikely and no longer actively 
pursued by the North Korean regime that has its main focus on survival of the current North 
Korean state as it exists today). When Khrushchev talked about ―peaceful co-existence‖, it 
was thus seen as a threat to the very legitimacy of the North Korean state itself. The Soviet 
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Union responded by cutting off their direct aid to North Korea. North Korea may have hoped 
that China would fill the Soviet Union‘s shoes and provide aid and assistance. China did so to 
a degree, but the same amounts of aid and assistance as those from the Soviet Union could not 
be provided by China. 
In Han S. Park‘s ‖North Korea: Ideology, Politics, Economy‖, Karoly Fendler makes a 
comparative analysis of the Soviet Union and China‘s economic assistance to North Korea in 
the postwar years (1953-1963). During this period there was a ―hostile international 
environment‖, as it was the early days of the Cold War and North Korea, who had to be 
rebuilt from the absolute beginning after the Korean War, was utterly dependent on economic 
aid from the other socialist countries.
47
 Although the Soviet Union was responsible for the 
major part of non-repayable aid, cancellation of debt and technical assistance, China also 
played a pivotal part in economically assisting North Korea. However, there are no reliable 
data concerning the exact size and amount of the Chinese aid and there are no reliable 
statistics that shows whether China actually cancelled any of the DPRK‘s debts or made any 
other arrangements. However, several Western studies estimates, according to Fendler, that 
China‘s contributions to the economic recovery in North Korea was around half of the Soviet 
assistance and loans during the postwar period.
48
 Chinese economic aid contributed a 
significant part of the overall economic aid and assistance provided by the Soviet and the 
communist block.  
―In other words, Chinese assistance and loans were generally absorbed in the Korean 
economy despite the temporary and often spectacular impact they made.‖49 
When Mao started the Great Leap Forward that culminated in the Cultural Revolution in 
China in 1966, it brought with itself chaos and many Red Guard publications that were 
negative to North Korea and its rather un-revolutionary government. The chaos in China was 
very unfavourable to the ruling North Koreans as they strived for stability in their 
government. North Korea answered China‘s new revolutionary line and critique by turning 
away from their pro-China orientation and assume a neutral stance in the Sino-Soviet conflict. 
Another reason for the shift in policies was that Khrushchev lost power to Brezhnev in 1964 
and that North Korea wanted to build a new relationship with the new political leadership in 
the Kremlin. This was marked among other incidents by the Soviet Prime Minister A. N. 
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Kosygin‘s visit to Pyongyang in 1965. Yet another factor for this change in policies could be 
that the Soviet Union was, as described by Fendler, still much more important as an aid donor 
for North Korea than China. Thus North Korea managed to keep its political relationships and 
their economical benefits with both China and the Soviet Union until the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.
50
  
Even though North Korea received huge amounts of aid, and managed to have a balanced 
relationship with both China and the Soviet Union, the idea of Juche has been prominent in 
North Korea ever since the mid 1950s. The Juche idea or ideology is a very important aspect 
and maybe even (at least in part) a result of the Sino-Soviet split and a very important aspect 
to include in the study of the political relationship, not just between China and North Korea, 
but between North Korea and every other country.  
In the introductory chapter of ―North Korea in the new world order‖, Callum Macdonald says 
that: 
―Juche became the guiding aspect of the state in the 1960s when the Soviet-Sino split 
gave the DPRK the reason and opportunity to pursue its own destiny.‖51 
Juche was according to official propaganda created by Kim Il Sung. The word is generally 
translated as self-reliance and he first emphasized its meaning in a speech in 1955: 
―It is important in our work to grasp revolutionary truth, Marxist-Leninist truth, and 
apply it correctly to our actual conditions. There should be no set rule that we must 
follow the Soviet pattern. Some advocate the Soviet way and others the Chinese, but is 
it not high time to work out our own?‖52 
In this speech Kim Il Sung stressed the importance of finding an independent way of 
development apart from both the Soviet and the Chinese; he preached patriotism and 
nationalism based on ―the truth of Marxism-Leninism‖ as tools for developing an independent 
national ideology. This speech is today being regarded as the ―birth of Juche‖, but back then it 
simply meant focusing on self-reliance in the stormy political waters of the time. Juche has 
later been hailed by North Korean propaganda as a ―brilliant and revolutionary idea‖, 
―unique‖ and ―the greatest invention of our time‖. The ―Dear Leader‖ Kim Jong Il, son of the 
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―Great Leader‖ Kim Il Sung Il has written many articles on what the Juche idea consist of and 
has become the chief interpreter of the state ideology. His interpretations of Juche will be 
presented later in this paper. 
In relation to China, Juche meant that North Korea distanced itself from Chinese policies and 
events, like for example the Cultural Revolution, and Juche would also mean that when China 
under Deng Xiaoping embarked on economic reforms, North Korea had no intention to follow 
suit. Although it may seem very simple at first, Juche is actually a very complex idea, 
however not in its content but in its origin, It is the historical events that lie behind the 
creation of Juche that is the key to understanding it, both from a political realist point of view 
as well as from that of comparative historical analysis. Juche is an integral part of North 
Korean politics, economy and military, and has arguably been a defining factor in the 
development of the political relationship between North Korea and China. This will be further 
discussed in the analysis. 
4.3 The collapse of the communist bloc, the death of Kim Il Sung and the “Arduous 
March” 
The 1990s started in the worst possible manner for North Korea as it witnessed the 
Tiananmen incident in China in 1989, and two years later the final fall of the Soviet Union. 
China opened up diplomatic ties with South Korea in August 1992, in 1994 Kim Il Sung 
suddenly died of a heart attack and plunged the whole nation out into sorrow, mourning and a 
shock-like state. His son, Kim Jong Il, ―the Dear Leader‖ who had been groomed for the job 
since the 1970s, replaced his father and a country in grave economic stagnation and decline. 
Then the public food distribution system (PDS) more or less broke down in the mid-nineties 
as a result of the ―Great Famine‖. The Great Famine or ―The Arduous March‖ or ―March of 
Tribulation‖ as it was sometimes called by official propaganda, was a series of natural 
disasters including floods and droughts, that combined with poor economic and agricultural 
management led to about 10 percent of the North Korean population starving to death. There 
are no exact numbers as there are no official data on this incident. At a Unicef Conference in 
Beijing in 2001, the estimate was claimed to be 220.000 by one of Pyongyang‘s deputy 
foreign ministers. However, other estimates said that it could be anywhere from 270.000 up to 
3.000.000 people.
53
 In an open report from 1998 to the chairman of the International Relations 
Committee in the House of Representatives in the U.S. it was said that every year, between 
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300,000-800,000 people have died. (Peaking in 1997.)
54
 The breakdown of the PDS 
proceeded more or less as the following: As harvests failed, the rations became smaller and 
smaller and people had to look elsewhere for food. Thus, the illegal trading of food and 
commodities accelerated and soon became the main instrument for average North Koreans to 
provide for themselves. The PDS never got back to what it used to be even after the worst 
parts of the famine were over, even though North Korea had received massive amounts of aid, 
not just from China, but from several NGO‘s as well. Buying and selling food and 
commodities was done on the black market and it had become the main source of distribution 
in the once centrally planned economy of North Korea. This is what is described as ―the 
movement from below‖ in the paper ―Reform from Below‖ by Marcus Noland and Stephan 
Haggard from 2009.
55
 The famine and the breakdown of the PDS, along with the fall of the 
Soviet Union, meant that North Korea became increasingly dependent on foreign aid, and the 
only reliable (and acceptable) source for the amounts of aid that was needed was China. 
Although North Korea managed to muddle through the great famine and the fact that some 
estimate that an incredible 10 percent of the population starved to death, the country has never 
been able to even come near its Juche ideals of complete self-reliance. Economically 
speaking, North Korea has become more and more dependent on Chinese aid and trade, and 
this dependency intensified especially after the 2002 United Nations sanctions after suspicions 
of the development of nuclear weapons by North Korea, and it intensified even further when 
the conservative Lee Myung-bak ended the South Korean Sunshine Policy
56
 towards North 
Korea. The problem for the Chinese is that they have become trapped in a situation where 
they cannot stop their aid flow to North Korea. This is pointed out among other places, in the 
book ―North Korea: Politics of regime survival‖, edited by Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack 
Kim: 
―As one senior Chinese leader said to a visiting U.S. scholar in the context of 
expressing China‘s opposition to any economic sanctions on North Korea, ―We can 
either send food to North Korea or they will send refugees to us – either way we feed 
them. It is easier to feed them in North Korea than in China.‖‖57 
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Although North Korea and China has become closer tied in regards of aid, and economic 
assistance (North Korea has become closer to China that is, not the other way around) China 
has distanced itself from North Korea in the political and military part of the relationship. 
Samuel S. Kim is a senior research scholar at the East Asian Institute of Columbia University. 
He was formerly a professor at Princeton University and he writes in Kihl and Kim‘s book: 
―Since 1992, the main overall challenge has remained the same: how to translate 
China‘s preference for peninsular status-quo-cum-stability by maintaining a ―special 
relationship‖ with Pyongyang while at the same time promoting and expanding 
―normal state relations‖ with Seoul.‖58 
According to Kim, China did not have much leverage over Pyongyang in the early nineties 
due to several factors, but mainly due to China‘s switch to a two Koreas policy, rather than 
just being pro-DPRK. However, around the turn of the millennia, the relationship began to 
normalize, signified by several visits by high ranking officials, including President Jiang 
Zemin‘s visit to North Korea in 2001 – a very rare gesture – Mao Zedong never visited, Deng 
Xiaoping visited only three times and Jiang Zemin himself had only been on one visit to 
North Korea before in 1990.
59
 This can however also be seen as a Chinese reaction to their 
souring relationship with the United States on background of the 1999 U.S. bombing of the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade
60
 
61
 and the ―apology controversy‖ following the spy-plane 
incident over Hainan in 2001.
62
 
A vital remnant of the Korean War is the 1961 PRC-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation 
and Mutual Assistance,
63
 and it was during the Cold War that the expression that China and 
North Korea were ―as close as lips and teeth‖ were used by among others Premier Zhou 
Enlai.
64
 Following the declaration of this treaty, visits from high ranking officials continued if 
not accelerated, but in 1995, shortly after Kim Il Sung‘s death in 1994, during Jiang Zemin‘s 
visit to South Korea, it was strongly hinted that the treaty was more or less dead. As is 
described by Kihl and Kim: 
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(…) a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated that the alliance did not commit 
Chinese troops to defending North Korea; Beijing wanted it known that it would not 
support Pyongyang if North Korea attacked South Korea.‖65 
In principle however, this treaty is still in effect. Just the fact that it has not been changed can 
tell us something about the relationship between the two countries because of what Russia did 
in 2001. In the year 2001, Russia signed the "Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourlines and 
Cooperation" which replaced the formal alliance from 1961. This was, according to a paper in 
Comparative Strategy Journal from 2010, done because Russia wanted an equally distanced 
relationship with South Korea as with North Korea.
66
 The fact that China has changed its 
original treaty in similar fashion reveals that China is not willing to officially change its 
position towards North Korea or upset its ally. 
To summarize the development of the political relationship between North Korea and China 
since the creation of DPRK in 1949, it can be said that is started out very close with the 
Chinese involvement in the Korean War, and since then it has gradually become less and less 
close. However, North Korea has become more dependent on China at the same time as China 
has distanced itself from North Korea. There is a big paradox that the more North Korea 
becomes dependent on China and Chinese aid and backing in political questions, the more 
China becomes bound to support North Korea to ensure its continued existence as a state. 
This paradox will be discussed thoroughly in the analysis. 
5.0 The modern relationship: 2000 to 2010 
A big part of the political relationship between North Korea and China during the first decade 
of the 21
st
 century revolved around the Six-Party Talks that lasted from 2003 to 2007 and 
counted six rounds in total. Another big factor was the continued stagnation in the North 
Korean economy. North Korea implemented some market-economic reforms in 2002, and 
world opinion believed that the country was on its way to follow in China‘s footsteps and 
gradually open up its economy. Despite this perception and two trips made by Kim Jong Il to 
China in the early 2000s to inspect the Chinese style of socialism and special economic zones, 
the North Korean economy remained as broken as ever. In 2005 the reforms were reversed, 
and in late 2009 a currency devaluation sought to deprive North Korean private market 
traders, smugglers and entrepreneurs of their capital. By the end of the decade it was clearer 
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than ever that North Korea had no intention in following China‘s style of market economy 
socialism, at least not from an official initiative. However, the private markets and illegal 
black market trading and smuggling across the Chinese – North Korean border being driven 
on by the movement from below could still play a big part in the future of the relationship. 
5.1 The Six Party Talks, nuclear tests, missile tests, UN sanctions and visits to China 
―By virtue of agreeing to hold the Six-Party Talks in Beijing, China has become more 
than an equal partner. It has assumed a greater role as intermediary or third party 
attempting to fulfill a diplomatic settlement between the DPRK and other participants 
of the United States, South Korea, Japan and Russia.‖67 
In short, the Six-Party Talks was centered on the five other parties, China, USA, Russia, 
Japan and South Korea wanting North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program and 
achieve a denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The situation arose when North Korea 
withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003. North Korea on the other hand claimed 
to have pursued nuclear ambitions for self defense and deterrence from the U.S. North Korea 
wanted recognition from the U.S. and assurance that the U.S. would not attack North Korea. 
Thus it was a more or less of a stalemate from the start, as the U.S. was not interested in 
giving such a guarantee or backing down from its demands for a dismantling of the North 
Korean nuclear weapons program. At the same time, North Korea was not interested in doing 
so, unless it received more in return than the U.S. was willing to give up. The Six-Party Talks 
was centered on the conflict between North Korea and the U.S., but it was China that served 
as the host, took the initiative and acted as chairman of the talks. 
On October 9
th
 2006 North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test, according to KCNA 
(Korean Central News Agency), the official North Korean mouthpiece.
68
 The test itself was 
relatively small, less than one kiloton and was confirmed by radioactivity in the air,
69
 
although it was suspected that the test was a misfire and was initially planned to be bigger. 
The Chinese Foreign Ministry released a press statement that condemned the action, and 
condemned North Korea for ignoring international laws, at the same time as they urged all 
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parties for a ―calm response‖70 and ―peaceful talks‖,71 in other words to continue with the Six-
Party Talks. 
On May 25
th
 2009 North Korea conducted a second nuclear test. According to Xinhua, the 
official press agency of the government in China released a statement referring to the 
government‘s reaction to North Korea‘s second nuclear test: 
―‖The DPRK ignored universal opposition of the international community and once 
more conducted the nuclear test. The Chinese government is resolutely opposed to it," 
the statement said.‖72 
It can also be speculated in that China agreed to host the Six Party Talks not just because of 
its interest in North Korea, but also because China wanted to achieve closer ties with the U.S. 
and make an effort in the global political landscape. At the same time it can be said that 
China‘s main goal was most likely to ensure the stability of the Korean peninsula. It is 
however no doubt that China contributed heavily to the Six-Party Talks and was actively 
searching for a solution. As Samuel S. Kim writes in an open report to the Strategic Studies 
institute: 
―The Chinese are reported to have made an exceptional effort in the fourth round of 
talks—the most important and extended round to date—mobilizing a professional 
work team of about 200 experts from nine departments or bureaus in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. These diplomats all spent day and night working on successive drafts 
of a joint statement of principles, pulling together the lowest common denominator 
among views laid out by the six parties in the behind-the-scenes negotiations, which 
included an unprecedented half-dozen bilateral meetings between U.S. and North 
Korean diplomats.‖73 
 
Samuel S. Kim continues and suggests that China used its influence to persuade Pyongyang to 
moderate its rhetoric and actions during the talks, as well as convincing them to downsize 
their demands for a non-aggression treaty from the United States. This was the core of North 
Koreas demands from the start, as well as the demand of being removed from the United 
States‘ list of states sponsoring terrorism. However, China could not convince North Korea 
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not to go through with its nuclear test firing on October 9
th
 2006 or the test launch of several 
long-reaching ballistic missiles on July the 5
th 
the same year.
74
 North Korea, on the other 
hand, defended their nuclear test and claimed it was purely for self-defence. North Korea‘s 
summarized statement on the nuclear test stated among other things that: 
―The DPRK has already declared that it would take all necessary countermeasures to 
defend the sovereignty of the country and the dignity of the nation from the Bush 
administration's vicious hostile actions.‖75 
In 2009 North Korea officially said it would withdraw and not enter another round of the Six-
Party Talks after heavy criticism from the UN Security Council following its satellite launch, 
which was accused of being a test-launch for long range missiles by North Korea‘s 
neighbours.
76
 
5.2 Cheonan and Yeonpyeong 
On March 26
th
 the South Korean Navy Corvette Cheonan broke in two and sank in the Yellow 
Sea, killing 46 South Korean seamen. The general opinion in the West and in South Korea 
was that this was due to a torpedo attack by a North Korean submarine, and an international 
independent committee (however working in close contact with South Korean authorities) 
also concluded that this was the most likely cause, although there were no absolute clues.
77
 
On November 23
rd
 there was an exchange of artillery fire between the North and South. On 
the Yeonpyeong island belonging to South Korea four people were killed by the North 
Korean artillery.
78
 The South claimed that North Korea had attacked first because of a South 
Korean military drill where South Korean artillery grenades had been fired into the water, but 
North Korea officially stated that they had been directly attacked by the South and had merely 
returned the fire.
79
 China did not take any clear stand in any of these incidents and Russia also 
joined in with the Chinese opinion and questioned the findings of the investigation of the 
Cheonan sinking.
80
 China said that the death of the South Korean sailors was a tragedy, and 
warned against escalation and confrontation after the shelling of the Yeonpyeong islands. 
China wanted to remain on the side and did not want to get drawn into this conflict, because 
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then it would have to choose a side between the two, and for the time being, China would like 
to maintain a good relationship to both parties, both North and South. 
5.3 Wikileaks 
In the end of 2010 Wikileaks revealed several documents that were taken by some as proof 
that China is indeed distancing itself from North Korea politically. According to South 
Korea‘s vice-foreign minister, two senior Chinese officials allegedly said that they wanted 
Korea to be unified under Seoul‘s control, and that this view was increasing with the 
leadership in Beijing as well. Another senior Chinese official said in private that the Chinese 
had less political influence over North Korea than what was presumed by the rest of the 
world, and that the Chinese public opinion was increasingly critical to its neighbour. This 
official also supposedly said that this was a view that was present not just in public opinion, 
but in the political leadership as well.
81
 This does not however necessarily have to mean that 
there is a wide acceptance of this thought as the Chinese Communist Party is very large and 
diverse and inhabited by many different political factions with different views. 
5.4 Economic relationship 
The economic relationship between China and North Korea can serve as an important point of 
reference when it comes to assessing the recent development of the political relationship 
between the two countries. In the last ten years, North Korea has become more and more 
economically dependent on China while North Korea has at the same time become less 
important for the Chinese. 
According to statistics from the World Trade Atlas,
82
 presented in a paper by the 
Congressional Research Service, China‘s exports and imports from North Korea has been 
rising steadily since around the turn of the millennia from 37.214 million dollars of imported 
goods in 2000 to 754.045 million dollars in 2010 and from 570.660 million dollars of exports 
in 2000 to 2,033.233 million dollars in 2010.
83
 However, China‘s total amount of trade with 
North Korea has become smaller and smaller at the same time, compared to trade with other 
countries. In 2008, China provided around half of the total amount of North Korean imports 
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and bought a quarter of the North Korean exports.
84
 This does not account for the smuggling 
across the border that is responsible for the black market trade of Chinese goods and 
commodities. Thus, there are good reasons to believe that the North Korean dependency on 
China is even bigger than these numbers suggest.
85
 China is also the largest foreign direct 
investor in North Korea, excluding the on again, off again South Korean investment project in 
the Kaesong Industrial Complex.
86
 For China on the other hand, the DPRK ranked 64
th
 among 
China‘s export markets which is smaller than Egypt, Hungary or Peru. On the import side 
North Korea ranked just 70
th 
which is well below countries such as Gabon or Yemen.
87
  
5.5 Summary 
During the first decade of the new century, North Korea grew increasingly dependent on 
Chinese assistance, both politically and economically, without giving away any significant 
political concessions towards China. The Six Party Talks were hosted by China and held in 
Beijing, but even though China attempted to play the role of third part and mediator between 
North Korea and the United States, the situation remained more or less the same. 
China‘s mediation diplomacy in and around the Six-Party Talks can still be said to have been 
decisive in creating dialogue and negotiations between the Northeast Asian States, Russia and 
the U.S. Unlike the nuclear standoff between North Korea and the U.S. in 1994, where China 
wanted the two parties to pursue bilateral talks and took a more neutral stance, this time China 
was active in promoting multilateral talks, even though North Korea had opted for bilateral 
talks with the U.S. (which the U.S. refused). This can be seen as a sign that China did not just 
want the conflict to be resolved; they wanted to be an active part in it. The Six-Party Talks 
was a historical change in the political relationship between North Korea and China and 
showed that China was no longer as close an ally to North Korea as they once were. China 
would no longer sit idly by and let North Korea do as it saw fit. 
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6.0 Analysis - How can the development of the political relationship 
between North Korea and China be explained? Based on the development, 
what can it tell about the future development of the relationship? 
6.1 A short summary of the historical development of the relationship  
The Korean peninsula has been under the cultural and political influence of China since 
ancient times, but after its division at the 38
th
 parallel, only North Korea has continued the 
long tradition of tight political and cultural ties with China. 
To summarize, North Korea was utterly dependent on China during the Korean War, but after 
it ceased, North Korea distanced itself politically even though it was still economically 
dependent on China, as well as other Soviet bloc countries, mainly the Soviet Union. North 
Korea assumed more or less a neutral stance in the Sino-Soviet conflict and received aid from 
both parties. However, after the fall of the Soviet Union and the disastrous decade of the 
1990s in North Korea, China was all that was left to rely on. 
6.2 The scope of the historical contemporary analysis 
Where is the limit of the historical comparative analysis approach? The Minsaengdan incident 
and the Kim Il Sung guerrilla faction can explain many of the qualities of the North Korean 
leadership and their political actions, but can this approach explain everything? It is possible 
to apply the history of Sino-Korean ties all the way back to ancient history, like Koreas place 
as a Chinese tributary state, and find similarities to today‘s relationship. It is however not 
assured that these similarities will be significant in any way. History can explain many of the 
qualities of the North Korean leadership, and links and historical similarities can be found, but 
it is not certain that such a comparison will be fruitful. Many of these comparisons could just 
as much be coincidences, as for example calling North Korea ―The Hermit Kingdom‖, a label 
that was put on the Korean Choson Dynasty after it sealed itself off from European contact, or 
Bruce Cumings‘ comparison of Kim Il Sung to the famous Choson emperor Yi Song-gye. 
As Hongkoo Han writes in his PhD, it is obvious that Kim Il Sung and his inner circle of 
guerrilla fighters that later became the core of the North Korean government, were definitely 
affected by the Minsaengdan incident. However, it is impossible to measure the magnitude of 
this impact, and as an example one can easily wonder if not any other head of state would, 
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just like Kim Il Sung, attempt to play China and Soviet against each other during the Cold 
War. 
6.3 The scope of classical realism 
In classical realism as defined by Hobbes and Morgenthau, the world is anarchic by nature 
and all actors continuously struggle to gain more power. This idea can be seen in the political 
relationship between North Korea and China in the way that they are continuously struggling 
for power and to influence the other actor. China tries to persuade and use its leverage over 
North Korea to lower the tensions whenever conflicts with South Korea, the U.S. and Japan 
arise. North Korea tries to comply with Chinese advice as little as possible while at the same 
time not crossing the line to alienate the Chinese regime. This struggle for power and leverage 
can be explained by the Chinese desire for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and 
the North Korean desire to follow its own set of politics and its own mode of development 
while receiving Chinese aid at the same time. Because these two approaches are contrasting, 
the two actors are locked in a struggle where they continuously try to influence each other and 
gain leverage. The notion of state survival and sovereignty as explained by Dougherty and 
Pfaltzgraff Jr. can also explain many of today‘s traits in North Korean politics, as for example 
their justification for developing nuclear weapons as well as their aggressive stance towards 
the U.S. and South Korea, and the goals being pursued during the Six-Party Talks. 
6.4 The scope of the transitologist perspective  
Transitology, as presented by Rudolf L Tőkés and Jordan Gans-Morse, is the comparative 
study of how former Soviet states in Eastern Europe underwent many of the same changes in 
the last years leading up to the dissolvement of the Soviet Union. These were changes like for 
example an emerging black market that featured market economy characteristics, or a 
softening of the political structure. Andrei Lankov writes in his paper ―The natural death of 
North Korean Stalinism‖ about how these black markets have supposedly affected North 
Korean authoritarianism and central planning as well. There are also many other papers on 
this phenomena, like the ones already mentioned by Haggard and Noland,
88
 or Christopher D 
Hale‘s paper from 2005 entitled: ―Real Reform in North Korea? The Aftermath of the July 
2002 Economic Measures.‖89 As can be seen, North Korea does share this very vital 
characteristic with these former Soviet states, but this is also where the similarities end. Yes, 
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there are black market upsurges just like in the former Soviet states, but North Korea does not 
want to incorporate it into their economy like China and these states did. Actually it did look 
like North Korea made an attempt to do just this with the July 1
st
 2002 Economic Reforms, 
dubbed ―market reforms‖ by several western analysts. These reforms were seen as an opening 
up of the North Korean regime and the North Korean economy, but in the end everything 
points to the fact that North Korea did in fact not want to adjust its economy to reap the 
benefits of the emerging market economy from below. This is usually explained by the North 
Korean government‘s fear of a free market leading to a flow of information about the outside 
world, especially South Korea and South Korean products. Such an opening up is probably 
rightfully feared by the government as it would show the huge differences between the two 
countries, and could lead to break down the picture that the North Korean propaganda tries to 
create. Instead North Korean officials aimed to channel all of the transactions from the black 
market economy into the state and centrally planned economy to get it under control. There 
were also some individual freedom that came along with these reforms, but in 2005 all of 
these reforms were reversed, and with the currency devaluation in 2009, it was clear that 
North Korea did not intend to follow in the footsteps of the former Soviet States or its 
neighbour China.  
Thus the only answer that the transitologist perspective gives to the study of the development 
of North Korean economy and politics, is that North Korea once again followed its own route 
of politics – a move that has become more and more obvious for each year passing. 
6.5 Analysis of the historical relationship up to 1949 
6.5.1 The importance of the guerrilla movement and the Minsaengdan incident 
Hongkoo Han writes in his conclusion among other things that: 
―In the early 1930s, the Minsaengdan incident delivered a blow to the Kando base area 
as fatal as the effects of an atomic bomb. (…) the survivors of the Minsaengdan 
incident – like the survivors of the A-bomb explosion – suffered severely and had to 
endure the pain of indelible wounds for generations.‖90 
It is clear that the collective memory of the Minsaengdan incident has contributed in some 
capacity to the politics of North Korea, but it is not easy to say to which degree. The only 
thing that is certain is that it was not the only factor that played in, no matter the magnitude 
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that it may have had. Looking at the Minsaengdan incident is mainly a historical comparative 
analysis approach to explain the later effects it has had on the North Korean policymaking. 
Applying realism does not make any sense because North Korea was not yet even born as a 
state during this time.  
6.6 Analysis of the historical relationship from 1949 to 2000 
6.6.1 The importance of Juche 
The idea of Juche was first mentioned in 1955 in a speech by Kim Il Sung, stressing the 
importance of neither following the Chinese, nor the Soviet way of economic and political 
development and government. The roots of Juche can clearly be seen to have been planted a 
long time ago, and the question of independence can be traced back to dynastic times. 
However, it is likely that the persons behind this ideology were more influenced by their own 
personal experiences than by the collective national memory. Still the possibility of the latter 
to be the defining point cannot be fully excluded, but it can be agreed upon that it is not very 
plausible. Another factor to take into account is that the political landscape at the time made 
the conditions for Juche ideal and that it was natural for North Korea to pursue its own 
developmental policy instead of relying on one of the greater powers. This is a political realist 
way of looking at it. 
There are several studies on Juche and the origins of Juche and there is no room to mention 
them all. However there are a few worth mentioning: Brian Reynolds Myers, associate 
professor of international studies at Dongseo University in Busan, has written a book about 
North Korean ideology based on reading and watching internal propaganda in the DPRK. It is 
called ―The Cleanest Race‖ and focuses solely upon how the North Koreans supposedly view 
themselves.
91
 B. R. Myers suggests that Juche is nothing but a ―smokescreen‖, branding North 
Korean society as purely racist. The ethnocentrism and racism he describes is meant to be 
able to explain every aspect of North Korean economy, military and other political choices. 
Presenting Juche as a cover-up for nationalism is not necessarily right and may be overly 
simplistic. Although self-sustainment and isolation can be seen as an extreme form of 
nationalism, and the North Korean population probably is the most ethnically homogeneous in 
the whole world, it is easy to argue that these aspects are just as much formed by other factors 
as it is blind ethnocentrism. As can be easily pointed out, racial ideology is for example 
certainly not unique to North Korea. It is not to be said that the North Korean propaganda that 
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Myers have studied isn‘t nationalistic, racist and xenophobic.92 However, to claim that 
paranoia and nationalism has not just influenced, but been the sole driving force behind every 
aspect of political decision-making for over 60 years is in danger of being overly simplistic, 
especially when this nationalism is not explained very well in depth. If Myers is rather one-
dimensional in his characteristics, then Han S. Park, Ph.D. at department of International 
Affairs at the University of Georgia presents a more multi-faceted explanation. In his book 
―The politics of unconventional wisdom‖, he claims that Juche is not just a political ideology. 
It is presented as a genuine religion with a god and an afterlife. Transcendentalism may be 
achieved when an individual is remembered by the people for its sacrifices for national or 
social courses; in other words: martyrdom is a way to achieve eternal life – to be forever 
remembered by the people of North Korea.
93
 This is how Kim Il Sung lives forever with the 
Korean people and forever will rule as the eternal president.  
However, the most important factor in the belief system of Juche is, according to Park, not its 
transcendentalism and theological qualities; it is indeed nationalism. The North Korean 
nationalism is hostile against the ―imperialist‖ United States and promotes the sovereignty of 
the Korean people. This goes so far that Korea is viewed as a chosen land, that North Koreans 
are told that world civilization evolved from Korea and that they are the leaders of the third 
world, the last stance of socialism and independence. North Korean nationalism is thus 
described by Park as ―ultra-ethnocentric.‖94 This is what Juche looks like today. However, 
Park points out the historical factors that he means has formed Juche. 
The evolution of Juche went from ―Anti-Japanism‖ from the mid-1920s to the 1950s, then 
―Anti-hegemonism‖ in the decade following the Korean War, appearing as a nationalist 
ideology in the late 1960s and much of the 1970s and then as ―Paternalist Socialism‖ 
beginning with the sixth party congress in 1980. This phase set the stage for Kim Jong Il‘s 
official promotion to the leadership and eventual succession. Finally Juche, according to Park 
evolved into ―a legitimate Weltanschauung with a philosophical structure.‖95 Another factor 
that formed Juche was a sort of an identity crisis after WW2 when Koreans had nothing to 
identify themselves with as their land had been ruled by the Japanese and were split between 
Washington on the one side and Moscow on the other. The charisma of Kim Il Sung is yet 
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another factor, and the fact that he is the ruler with the longest reign in modern time (46 
years). Furthermore, North Korea is according to itself the last genuine social system left and 
therefore has a sacred mission to save humanity from capitalism and the moral and spiritual 
decay that follows in its wake.
96
 
The idea of a strong sense of collectivism between all Koreans is very apparent in Juche 
ideology and it is described as analogous to fish in a fishbowl by Park. The fish are the North 
Koreans and the bowl is the state – the only thing keeping the fish safe.97 Political self-
determination and nationalism go hand in hand for North Korea. Liberating South Korea is in 
the sake of the nation, unifying the Korean people, making them free and whole is the 
ultimate goal, much more than socialism and equal distribution.
98
 
The philosophical principles of Juche, which also explains the transcendental qualities of it, is 
according to Park that classical communist class consciousness has been substituted with 
national consciousness, a consciousness that supersedes all other forms of beliefs and 
legitimises all forms for political purges within North Korea. The nationalism is founded upon 
the struggle and the rejection of foreign hegemonic powers; first Japan and then the United 
States. China is not mentioned in this setting, probably because it is not a ―hegemonic power‖, 
but the Korean guerrilla‘s relationship with China during the anti-Japanese struggle could 
very well have been mentioned in this setting. The North Korean nationalism and anti-
foreignism is so strong that it has, according to Park, acquired a form of self-affirmation. The 
result is that every North Korean individual is not worthy of life if they are deprived by their 
nation because the North Korean state as it exists today is an invisible and sacred entity. 
Therefore, complete loyalty to the nation supposedly supersedes all other forms of 
behavioural orientation.
99
 
Neither of these two views mentions the Minsaengdan incident and the relationship between 
the Korean guerrillas and the Chinese. Han S. Park touches indirectly upon the subject when 
he talks about anti-Japanism. B.R. Myers also touches indirectly upon the subject when he 
talks about the Korean nationalism but only in the sense that some of it may have been the 
result of the Minsaengdan incident. However, he attributes these feelings to be anti-Japanese. 
Although the Japanese are strongly resented in the North Korean national collective memory 
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for their actions during the colonial period and WW2, it seems inadequate to base over 60 
years of policymaking in this assumption alone. If one were to explain Juche based on 
nationalism, it would have made more sense to include the Minsaengdan incident and Kim Il 
Sung and his guerrillas‘ relationship with China, both before and after the formation of the 
DPRK. There are two reasons for this: The first is that almost all of the people constituting the 
North Korean core government had been victims of both Chinese and Soviet racial 
discrimination and betrayal – from people that were supposed to be on their side in the fight 
against the Japanese. The second reason is that the implementation of Juche came at a time 
when North Korea had minimal economical and political connections with Japan anyway. 
6.6.2 Kim Jong Il and the official North Korean view on Juche 
Kim Jong Il inherited the position as ―Dear Leader‖ from his father, the ―Great Leader.‖ He 
has held several speeches on Juche and in these speeches he presents himself as the highest 
authority on the subject, correcting other Juche theoreticians. According to Juche as it is 
presented by Kim Jong Il: 
- Every nation in the world is independent – and every of these nations are made up of 
people of the same ethnicity. 
- ―Inequality occurs when the independence of nations is trampled upon.‖ 
- In a capitalist society where the individuals of the same ethnicity are split into 
different classes, national unity can not be achieved. 
- Every nation should develop by itself to become strong, prosperous etc. by the means 
of socialism.
100
 
 
―Man is the master of everything and decides everything.‖101 
 
This is probably the most frequent cited sentence from Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il‘s Juche 
interpretation and it is also meant to explain the Juche ideology as a whole in just one 
sentence. It fits with Park‘s reference to the fishbowl analogy. Every individual is a part of the 
state (bowl) and the state is also the master of everything as it is supposed to be an extension 
of every individual North Korean. The notion is used to explain that man is the only animal 
capable of forming social groups, societies and nations. This is the basis upon which the idea 
of a strong and nationalistic state is built. 
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Juche insists on being a continuation of and an improvement of Marxism and Leninism. 
However, the Juche worldview claims to defy the Marxist notion that class struggle and social 
movement is based on economical differences between the proletariat and the capitalists. 
Instead it preaches that man is a ―social being‖ and that collectivism, which becomes the 
natural pre-requisite for socialism, is an innate quality; a priori if you like. Man is born with a 
sense of collectivism and this collectivism is not triggered by economical inequality or 
injustice.
102
 
The a priori collectivism preached by Juche can be said to fit well in with any description of 
nationalism, racism or ethnocentrism. Man is a social being and although Juche does not have 
a blueprint for how to organise all the different ethnic groups in the world who may be fit to 
stay together in a social movement, it is both implicit and explicit that all Koreans belong to 
the same social movement, and that they have this innate wish, almost like a biological 
instinct for belonging together: 
―Those who have the blood and soul of the Korean nation must link their own destiny 
with the destiny of the country and nation and fight devoting body and soul for the 
independent reunification of the country and the prosperity of the nation, no matter 
which class and strata they belong to and which social system they live in and whether 
they live at home or abroad.‖103 
Kim Jong Il and the official North Korean view of Juche bases the Juche idea on nationalism 
and ethnocentrism, as does B.R. Meyers. Han S. Park presents a more historically founded 
view that certainly contains elements of classical realism, but ultimately his explanations are 
also grounded in the North Korean nationalism. Hongkoo Han‘s analysis of the Minsaengdan 
incident is useful as a link to understanding how a portion of this nationalism can be directly 
linked to the historical relationship with China. 
As can be seen from the different approaches to Juche presented in this analysis, the 
emergence of Juche can be explained by two major different approaches:  
- The idea that Juche was born out of the collective memory of the Korean nation and 
the experiences of the North Korean leaders during the anti-Japanese struggle in the 
1930s. 
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- The idea that Juche was a natural response to the political climate at the time.  
The first idea marks the historical contemporary analysis approach and the second idea is that 
of a more classical realist approach. The most obvious answer is of course to say that it was 
not just one or the other, but a combination of the two. However, had there been no historical 
justifications for Juche, there could not have been a combination of the two. So, it can be 
argued that the historical incidents, especially those of whom Kim Il Sung participated in, and 
also to a degree, the collective national memory and Korea‘s place in the world in earlier 
times, laid the basis for the birth of Juche, or at least a sort of moral justification for it. Later, 
the political realist conditions for Juche became more solid as the Cold War evolved and the 
Sino-Soviet split became obvious, and finally the justification for Juche did not look as far-
fetched as it may seem to outsiders today. It can therefore be argued that the birth of Juche 
was in a great part born out of the development of the political relationship between North 
Korea and China. 
Juche meant that North Korea pursued an extremely isolationistic strategy both politically, 
economically and militarily, and it ultimately led to North Korea losing the economic 
development battle with South Korea, which it had actually led in the years after the Korean 
War. The North Korean economic growth slowed down and stagnated because of the 
limitations of the Juche economy and North Korea became more and more dependent on aid. 
When the Soviet Union was dissolved, the defeat of the Juche economy was final, and a big 
part of the 1990s great famine could be attributed to Juche economy and Juche politics. North 
Korea has in many ways continued to pursue the Juche ideology by continued economic and 
political isolation, because Juche has become so deep-rooted in the North Korean nation that 
it can‘t be easily cast aside. This is a big part of why North Korea is so hesitant to any reforms 
that may change the current conditions in the country. 
As the second approach points out, Juche does also have a considerable political realist 
explanation, which can be seen by looking at the political world at the time and events such as 
the Korean War, the Cold War and the Sino-Soviet split. These are all incidents that made the 
northern part of the Korean peninsula an ideal prospect for a project on extreme isolationism 
and attempted self-sufficiency. The North Korean nationalism may also be understood from a 
realist perspective, as the desire for independence and sovereignty is the backbone of the 
state, as explained by Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff Jr. 
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The exact origins of Juche may be disputed, but what can be agreed upon is that a 
considerable portion of it came from the historical development of the political relationship 
with China. It came both from the relationship between the Korean guerillas and the Chinese 
in Manchuria in the 1930s, and from the realist policies pursued by North Korea during the 
Cold War and the Sino-Soviet split. Still, no matter the exact origins, Juche politics has 
probably been the most influential factor in shaping North Korean politics and thus the North 
Korean political relationship with China. 
6.7 Analysis of the historical relationship from 2000 to 2010 
6.7.1 The results of the Six-Party Talks 
The only result of the Six-Party Talks, if there can be said that there even were any significant 
results, were that China distanced itself from North Korea and fronted itself as a ―responsible 
great power‖, a phrase that these days is heard more and more often in Chinese media and 
more and more often spoken by Chinese officials. From the North Korean point of view, the 
Six-Party Talks cannot really be explained by transitology or comparative historical analysis. 
The historical reasons for North Korea to develop nuclear weapons as a deterrent may be said 
to be the collective memories of the Korean War, but classical realism explains why North 
Korea tried to force the U.S. into concession by developing nuclear capabilities. This was a 
very clear example of a classical realist power struggle. 
6.8 The development of the relationship from the North Korean side 
The North Korean approach to China is both of a realist and a historical nature. At the same 
time as there still exists a strong national collective memory of the Minsaengdan incident and 
the Korean War, there are also some very practical and real challenges that lie before the 
North Korean government. Some of the political decisions, such as the brinkmanship strategy 
with the United States and China are not just born out of a collective national memory, but 
also born out of a desperate need for foreign capital, recognition from the United States and 
lifting of the United Nations economic sanctions imposed on the country. These are very real 
problems that any state would find undesirable and attempt to find a solution to, regardless of 
historical background. 
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6.9 North Korea’s “survival strategy” and how China fits into it 
China is probably seen as an ally and a kind of ―political buffer state‖ between North Korea 
and the rest of the world. Had it not been for the existence of the Chinese state, then there 
would likely have been a much more hostile view on North Korea by its regional neighbours 
and also in the world as a whole. China functions internationally as a sort of mediator or a 
shock-absorber between North Korea and the rest of the world. This can be seen among other 
places in the Six-Party Talks, where it was China that arranged the whole process and 
convinced the other parties to join. The Six-Party talks were not just an attempt by China, 
Russia, Japan, South Korea and the United States to disarm North Korea‘s nuclear 
capabilities. It was also a North Korean attempt to gain acceptance and economic benefits 
from the other five parties, mainly the United States. In the end it did not go quite as planned 
for any of the parties, but the possibilities were created by China‘s role as mediator for North 
Korea. Other recent examples of China cooling the international climate around North Korea 
are the two incidents in 2010, when the South Korean navy ship Cheonan sank and 46 South 
Koreans died, and the Chinese reaction to the shelling of the Yeonpyeong islands in late 2010 
as well as the reaction to the North Korean nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. Most of the 
international community, including the Western nations and their allies, joined in the 
assumption that North Korea was behind the sinking of the Cheonan, and an international 
independent investigation (made up of five countries, including South Korea)
104
 also 
confirmed that this was the most likely cause. However, there were not any decisive evidence 
and a recent survey carried out by the conservative South Korean group DailyNK (which 
advocates ―democratization‖ of North Korea) shows that even as many as 3 in 10 South 
Koreans believe that North Korea did not sink the Cheonan. The cause that most of these 
people believe in is that the Cheonan ran aground or was hit by a South Korean mine.
105
 
North Korea denied any involvement and China also avoided to pass any guilt. The same 
happened after the shelling of the Yeonpyeong islands when four South Koreans were killed 
by North Korean artillery. This time the question was who had started the provocations and 
again China avoided taking any side in the conflict, simply stating that the loss of lives were 
tragic and that the parties should get together for peaceful negotiations. That China did not 
take any side, was the same as taking North Korea‘s side as it was one of the few countries in 
the world not to condemn North Korea. However, China did not defend North Korea‘s actions 
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and this was a further sign of China‘s function as a mediator and a hot air vent for North 
Korea, as such an action would clearly have intensified the situation. The North Korean 
government cannot fully count on Chinese support, but they can always count on that China 
will try its best to defuse any difficult situations. This is how China fits into North Korea‘s 
strategy of aggression and confrontation followed by calls for negotiation and cooperation, 
followed again by aggression and confrontation and so on. This is an approach that is easily 
explained by classical realism. Just like in the Six-Party Talks, North Korean politics are 
governed by a realist approach – their ultimate goal is to gain influence and leverage, mainly 
over the U.S. and thus achieve their goals of economic and political stabilization. Even though 
contributing to the conflict, North Korea knows that it can rely on China as long as it does not 
go too far. In addition to this realist approach, it can be mentioned that there are also examples 
of North Korea playing on its history with China to draw on Chinese sympathy and emphasize 
the strategic position of North Korea, like for example the North Korean official memorial 
service of the 60
th
 anniversary of the death of Mao‘s son (who was killed in the Korean War 
and is buried in Pyongyang), Mao Anying, as reported by Chinese and North Korean 
media.
106
 
107
 (This ceremony, suspiciously to some, came only two days after the Yeonpyeong 
islands incident.)
108
 
6.10 The development of the relationship from the Chinese side 
The political relationship between China and North Korea has gone from being ―as close as 
lips and teeth‖, and communist allies in the fight against ―U.S. imperialism‖ in the Korean 
War, to today‘s situation where North Korea is seen simply as a burden in the eyes of many  
Chinese. When you ask a regular Chinese person today of what he or she thinks of North 
Korea and the state it is in, it is not unusual to hear that ―North Korea is just like China was 
40 or 50 years ago.‖ From this it can be understood that many Chinese believes that North 
Korea is just as capable of economic and political reform as China was. This is of course a 
very simplistic presentation, and there are several obstacles that stand in the way of North 
Korean reform that are greater than those faced by China in the 1980s. Nevertheless, there 
seems to be a common feeling in China that North Korea is somewhat of an anachronism in 
the international community and more or less a lost cause – they just don‘t want to reform. 
This view is grounded in China‘s own transformation from agrarian centrally planned 
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communism under Mao Zedong to reformation, market capitalism and economic success 
under Deng Xiaoping and onwards. As China‘s total trade amount started to rise with the rest 
of the world compared to North Korea, the relationship became less significant. This is one of 
two major changes in the relationship between China and North Korea, and it is continuing to 
this day. The other big change is of course the end of the Cold War and the diminished role of 
North Korea as a buffer zone. Although there are some Chinese projects concerning raw 
materials and infrastructure in North Korea, there are much more lucrative deals for China to 
be made for example in Africa. North Korea is just not that economically important to China 
any longer. As mentioned earlier, China imports more goods from Gabon than they do from 
North Korea. However, according to a report from Crisis Group entitled ―Shades of Red‖, 
China does in fact have a long-term development strategy concerning expanding its economic 
interests and access to North Korean raw materials, especially iron ore and coal as well as 
some infrastructure deals.
109
 But then again, even if China does expand its economic interests 
in North Korea, it will still only contribute to a fraction of the total Chinese trade.  
China‘s relationship with North Korea has diminished to that of a concern of how China can 
avoid any burden that might come, should North Korea fail as a state and, or use military 
force against South Korea, Japan or the United States. To avoid this, China seeks to secure the 
current regime. This is done through aid, political support in the form of a neutral stance in 
conflicts that North Korea is involved in and mediating, encouraging negotiations and a 
resumption of the Six-Party talks. In effect this means a continuation of the status quo. 
Therefore, all signs point to that China will continue to support the current change of power in 
North Korea from father to son in a bid to see continued stability in North Korea. Another fact 
that points in the same direction is that China is still officially allied to North Korea and will 
probably not do anything to formally change this status. 
6.11 Why have North Korea not followed in China’s footsteps of political and 
economical development? – Transitology meets political realism, Juche and historical 
comparative analysis 
This question: ―Why have not North Korea followed in China‘s footsteps of political and 
economical development‖, is much more complex than it may seem. First of all, the two 
countries are not very similar, contrary to popular belief. Although they are both ―communist‖ 
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states, most of the similarities stop there. North Korea was after WW2 much more 
industrialized than China, as a result of the Japanese building almost all of their factories in 
Korea in the northern part of the country. China was an agrarian society and had almost 
infinite amounts of countryside people who could be relocated to industry. Political economist 
and author of several articles on North and South Korea, Nick Eberstadt explains in more 
detail in his book ―The North Korean Economy‖: 
China was after the death of Mao a rural and agrarian society with a huge rural workforce 
ready to move into other sectors of production. North Korea was, and still is, however already 
urbanized and industrialized and looked more like an East European post-Soviet country than 
it resembled China. Post-Maoist China also had a measure of macroeconomic stability (long-
term stability in the inflation rate, low interest rate and a steady increase in assets), while 
North Korea is one of the most unstable economies in the world today. Due to the high 
inflation rate, the North Korean Won is unsuitable for economic exchange, unlike the Chinese 
Yuan. Furthermore, of Deng Xiaoping‘s four modernizations, the military, a big fund-drainer 
in any planned economy, was the last post on the agenda to be modernised, while North 
Korea today continues to pursue its military first policy (songun).
110
 China was supported by 
ethnic Chinese from abroad with capital investments, entrepreneurship and technology for an 
easier entry into the world markets. North Korea is nowhere near having that same 
opportunity, and it could also be labelled as counter-revolutionary by Pyongyang.
111
 
Furthermore, China and Vietnam (who has reformed in many ways like China) never had a 
southern neighbour more successful.
112
 The DPRK leaders fear that economic reforms 
inevitably will lead to increased openness to the outside which will allow the population to 
see how dreadfully their country has been managed and that there is a better alternative south 
of the border. This dilemma is also well explained in the article ―Is North Korea moving 
toward a Market Economy‖ by professors at Seoul University Lim Hyun-Chin and Chung 
Young Chul.
113
 Another aspect of this dilemma, presented by Dae-Won Koh in his paper 
―Dynamics of Inter-Korean Conflict and North Korea‘s Recent Policy Changes‖, is that, 
should the state collapse, the southern neighbour is ready to annex it: 
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―(…) the leadership is in a much tighter stalemate than in the cases of the Soviet 
Union, China, and Vietnam, which have already adopted a system-reforming option. 
In those cases, the ruling elites did not strongly fear that admitting system failure and 
adopting radical reforms would lead to extermination of their regimes or states.‖114 
Still, maybe the biggest difference between China and North Korea is that China managed to 
normalize their relations with the USA, spur trade and investment and being able to enter the 
global economic markets, but North Korea can‘t do this today. These facts do not stop China 
from promoting its own experiences of economic liberalization and growth to North Korea. 
According to the ―Shades of Red‖ report from Crisis Group, China has a long-term blueprint 
for North Korea that is based on its own model. The visit from Kim Jong Il to China‘s first 
special economic zone, Shenzhen, in January 2006, and North Korean Premier Kim Young 
Il‘s March 2009 tour of the Shandong Province, where he was shown its economic 
achievements, are examples of how China tries to offer its own model as an example for 
North Korean economic growth.
115
 It has however not yielded any significant results so far. 
7.0 The future of the relationship 
Predicting the future of anything that has to with North Korea has forever been an extreme 
sport of political science. Things just don‘t seem to go as predicted and there are always 
surprises in how the North Korean government behaves. Since 1994 when Kim Il Sung 
suddenly died, everyone has been waiting for North Korea to collapse, and even though North 
Korea managed to muddle through the great famine and into the 2000s, the idea of a North 
Korea on the verge of collapse can still be seen present in most researchers‘ and analyst‘s 
papers. Very few people had predicted that North Korea would still be alive as a state in 2010 
and very many people were wrong. This time, it is the rumoured failing health of Kim Jong Il 
that is the weight on the scale when it comes to analyzing North Korean future, and there is a 
general opinion that there will be a succession crisis when he dies and that his third son Kim 
Jong Un will not be up to the task of succeeding him. 
7.1 The Chinese future approach – Chinese strategists vs. traditionalists 
Looking at the historical relationship between China and North Korea seen from the Chinese 
side, it can be argued that the Chinese will continue to distance themselves from North Korea. 
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After the Korean War where the Chinese Volunteer‘s Army stepped into the conflict to save 
North Korea, the relationship has become less and less valuable for the Chinese. Where North 
Korea once was a buffer state during the Cold War, it is now probably seen more and more as 
a threat in the form of potential refugee flows, armed conflict and nuclear proliferation. 
In a report from Crisis Group in 2009, there is presented an internal debate in China between 
two groups that have conflicting views on North Korea. The two groups are called 
traditionalists and strategists. The first group favours the traditional relationship between 
North Korea and China, based on historical and strategic foundations. The second group 
favours a more realist approach, cut off from historical traditions. Zhang Liangui, a North 
Korea specialist at the International Strategic Studies Institute of the Central Party School, is a 
representative of the strategists‘ position. His main arguments are that: 
- China is the immediate victim of the North Korean nuclear and missile tests because 
of its geographical position next to North Korea. 
- North Korea is both ignoring Chinese advice and interests at the same time as they are 
continuing to receive Chinese aid. Thus North Korea is both a strategic and economic 
liability. 
- China should use its economic leverage to influence North Korean policy and stop 
―bribing‖ the North Korean government with aid. 
- China should actively pursue a resumption of the Six-Party talks to increase its 
leverage over North Korea.‖116 
The primary ―traditionalist‖ arguments are: 
- China and North Korea fought a war together against the Americans and the 
relationship is still like ―lips and teeth‖. 
- China should not risk damaging the relationship with an important neighbouring 
country. 
- China must pre-empt international pressure to avoid provocative or desperate actions 
by Pyongyang. For the same reason China must also continue to offer economic aid to 
North Korea. 
- North Korea is still a buffer zone against American soldiers and is still a big military 
strategic asset.
117
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Granted that such a conflict really exists internally in the Chinese Communist Party, it is not 
easy to predict if one of them will triumph or what degree of influence they will have. Up 
until now there are examples of both directions being followed: China has stood by its ally 
and has not made any significant moves to attempt to exert pressure or use its economic 
leverage to significantly change the political choices of the North Korean government. China 
has also stood (relatively) by North Korea‘s side in the recent conflicts with South Korea over 
the Cheonan sinking and the Yeonpyeong island shelling. However, China‘s strategic 
dependence of North Korea as a buffer zone has changed, at least in relation to what it was 
during the Cold War. Furthermore, China was actively attempting to persuade North Korea to 
exert moderation during the Six-Party Talks and also condemned the North Korean nuclear 
tests in 2006 and 2009. Still, it can be added that China did approve the appointment of Kim 
Jong Un, Kim Jong Il‘s third son to high positions and eventual succession, and in doing so, 
approved to the continuation of the current regime and its politics. This happened during the 
Korea Worker‘s Party Conference on September 28th 2010, and China‘s role in accepting the 
succession plans are evidenced by for example sending Zhou Yongkang, a standing member 
of the Chinese Politburo to express China‘s best wishes. He also carried with him an 
invitation for the new core group of North Korean leaders to visit Beijing. This is described 
by visiting Professor Han Dong-ho at the Korean Institute of Foreign Affairs and National 
Security in an essay published in the South Korean monthly journal ―Korea Focus‖.118 
Although it is not easy to predict the future Chinese approach, it can be seen from the 
development of the relationship that China is probably not going to protect North Korea any 
more than it has done in the recent years. China may not actively engage in any regime 
threatening actions, but the question of North Korea as a strategic asset or liability will 
probably continue to balance the Chinese approach. It can be argued that today North Korea is 
more of a liability than an asset because of the changed economical and strategically situation. 
However, discontinuing support of the North Korean regime on the grounds that it is only a 
liability could lead to it becoming a much bigger liability, in the form of a highly unstable 
North Korea. North Korea is still seen as an asset by some in the form of its status as a buffer 
zone against American troops. This asset is however becoming less and less significant as the 
United States and China have become extremely interdependent economically and because 
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the Cold War ended 20 years ago. It can therefore be said that North Korea is both an asset 
and a liability, but the only real asset is that it is not a bigger liability than it currently is.  
7.2 The North Korean future approach 
As has been suggested in this analysis so far, the North Korean approach to China has been 
governed in a great deal by historical incidents, like the Minsaengdan incident was an 
important factor in the process of the formation of Juche. However, the politics of today are 
more pragmatic. According to Northeast Asia expert Daniel Pinkston at the International 
Crisis Group, as he is quoted in a report written by the Council on Foreign Relations: 
―The North Koreans are developing a much more realist approach to their foreign 
policy,‖ Pinkston says. ―They're saying imbalances of power are dangerous and the 
United States has too much power--so by increasing their own power they're helping 
to balance out world stability. It's neorealism straight out of an international relations 
textbook.‖119 
A similar realist approach to foreign politics can be found in North Korean relations with 
China in the last decade. North Korea is clearly defying Chinese advice and maintaining an 
un-cooperative position in an attempt to gain power and to exert influence, not just over China 
but also over other parties. This was especially on display during the Six-Party Talks of which 
the essence was that North Korea was willing to trade in its nuclear weapons program only for 
benefits and recognition from the United States. The recent military clashes with South Korea 
can also be viewed in this context. 
In short it could be argued that history has produced the circumstances and the current 
conditions. However, the current conditions may be worked at from different angles than the 
angles that created the historical conditions. Therefore there is a mixed approach: Although 
the current conditions are being worked at from a realist perspective, the present conditions 
cannot be escaped. Given its very special place in the globalised world today, it is a strong 
possibility that North Korea will continue to rely on China at the same time as continuing to 
balance their relationship with South Korea and the United States, shifting from provocations 
to peaceful approaches as it has done in the recent years. Neither political realism, historical 
contemporary analysis nor the transitologist approach provides any hints that North Korea 
will undergo a sudden political change in its relationship to China in the near future.  
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8.0 Conclusion 
This paper has presented a different approach in analyzing North Korean politics by looking 
at the historical development of the political relationship between North Korea and China. 
This relationship has been analyzed by three different theories where the historical 
comparative analysis has the biggest explanatory power. It shows how political decisions and 
a big portion of the political structure in North Korea can be linked to Chinese influence, and 
it also shows how this influence has been active in shaping the historical development of the 
political relationship between the two countries. The political realist approach shows how 
North Korea and China are locked in a struggle for influence and power over the other part 
and how they both have their own visions for a better future for North Korea and how to 
achieve it. These two views are conflicting. This is in turn showed by the transitologist 
perspective that shows how there is no political will in North Korea to embark on political or 
economic reforms similar to the Chinese reforms in the 1980‘s, or those of any other 
previously communist state. Therefore, it is hard to predict any radical changes in the future 
of the political relationship between the two countries. However, based on the historical 
development, it can be suggested that North Korea will continue to resist Chinese pressure in 
political decisions, but at the same time North Korea is becoming more and more dependent 
on Chinese economical and political support. This paradox will not necessarily reach any 
climax because China is not ready to see the North Korean state collapse at any time in the 
near future. The only thing that can be predicted, based on the historical development of the 
political relationship, is that the struggle for influence over the other part will continue. 
History has laid the foundation for today‘s politics and this can be easiest seen in the North 
Korean Juche-inspired seemingly never-changing political structure. Today‘s and tomorrow‘s 
politics are formed by a political realist approach by both parts, inside the framework that has 
been constructed by the historical development of the very special political relationship 
between North Korea and China. 
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Timeline of incidents regarding the Sino-North Korean relationship 
mentioned in this paper: 
2,000 
B.C 
The first archeological sign of this influence is the spread of a new pottery culture 
with painted designs that spread from China to Korea. 
1,000 –  
900 B.C 
The appearance of rice cultivation during the Bronze Age in Korea 
57 B.C.–  
995 A.D  
 
Silla. Tributary in some form to different Chinese dynasties. 
37 B.C.–  
668 A.D  
Koguryo. Tributary in some form to different Chinese dynasties. 
18 B.C.–  
660 A.D 
Paekche. Tributary in some form to different Chinese dynasties. 
1271 –  
1368 
The Chinese Mongol Yuan Dynasty rising to power in China and capturing the 
Korean Koryo Dynasty as a tribute state. 
1592 Japanese forces landed at Pusan in vast numbers in the spring. 
1593 The Ming Chinese army came with 50.000 men and won a victory at Haengju. 
1597 
 
The Japanese launched another attack, but were again repelled by the Koreans 
and the Ming Army. 
1627  
 
The Manchu Qing dynasty launched their first invasion on Korea in and Korea 
eventually assumed the position of tributary state to the Qing Dynasty. 
1894 
 
On July 23 the Sino-Japanese war broke out with Japanese forces seizing the 
Korean royal palace, 
1895 
 
April 17
th
 1895 the war ended with total victory for Japan. The Qing Dynasty was 
forced to acknowledge Korea‘s full independence and the long tradition of Sino-
Korean tributary relations was finally broken. 
1912  Kim Song Ju (Kim Il Sung) was born. 
1933 –  
1936 
 
Over 1,000 Koreans were expelled from the Chinese Communist Party as 
suspects of being members of, or collaborating with the Minsaengdan and 
between 500 and 2,000 Koreans were executed. Kim Il Sung himself was also 
arrested 
1940 –  Kim Il Sung was a major in active duty in the Soviet Red Army, but was 
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1947  stationed in the Soviet Union 
1948 Kim Il Sung became the leader of the Korean People‘s Army (KPA) at its 
founding on February 8
th
 1948. 
1949  Kim Il Sung was hailed ―supreme leader‖ at the first anniversary of the Korean 
Workers Communist Party, meaning he was officially in charge of the whole 
country. 
1950- 
1953 
The Korean War 
1955 Kim Il Sung mentions the ―Juche‖ idea in a speech for the first time 
1961 
 
Kim Il Sung and Zhou Enlai signs a treaty of friendship between the two 
countries and a week later a similar treaty were signed with the Soviet Union. 
1962 –  
1963  
 
The DPRK starts shifting more and more towards relying on and siding with 
China. The official North Korean newspaper Rodong Sinmun in October heavily 
criticized the Soviet position towards China. On 27 January the same newspaper 
denounced Khrushchev for arguing for ―peaceful coexistence‖, and the North 
Korean leadership denounced the Soviet ―capitulation‖ in the Cuban missile 
crisis. 
1964 
 
Khrushchev lost power to Brezhnev in 1964 and North Korea wanted to build a 
new relationship with the new political leadership in the Kremlin. 
1966 The Great Leap Forward that culminates in the Cultural Revolution. It brought 
with itself chaos and many Red Guard publications that were negative to North 
Korea and its rather un-revolutionary government. 
1991 The Soviet Union falls apart. 
1994 Kim Il Sung dies. 
1995 – 
1999 
The Arduous March / The Great Famine / The March of Tribulation – some 
estimates show that as many or maybe even more than 10% of the population 
starves to death. 
2001 
 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin visits North Korea, and it signifies a better 
relationship. 
2002 
 
North Korea implements ―market reforms‖ in an attempt to control the black 
market economy. 
2003 –  
2007  
The Six Party Talks. (Six rounds in total) 
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2006 
 
North Korea conducts its first underground nuclear test and test-fires several 
long-range ballistic missiles. 
2009 North Korea conducts its second underground nuclear test. 
2009 North Korea states that it will not enter another round of the Six-Party Talks. 
2009 
 
North Korea implements a currency devaluation in an attempt to wipe out all 
black market trading and private entrepreneurs. 
2010 
 
The South Korean navy corvette Cheonan is sunk. North Korea denies any 
involvement although the Western world is condemning it as a torpedo attack. 
China assumes takes a neutral stance. 
2010 
 
China approves the appointment and eventual succession of Kim Jong Un, Kim 
Jong Il‘s son to high positions and eventual succession during the Korea 
Worker‘s Party Conference on September 28th 2010. 
2010 North Korean artillery kills two soldiers and two civilians on the island of 
Yeonpyeong. Both North and South Korea blames the other part for being the 
provocative part, firing the first shots. China assumes a neutral stance. 
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Table is taken from the paper: ―China-North Korea Relations‖ (included in the sources) 
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Table is taken from the paper: ―China-North Korea Relations‖ (included in the sources)  
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Chinese Communism Subject Archive 
Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance  
Between the People's Republic of China  
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 
 
Source: Peking Review, Vol. 4, No. 28, p.5. 
Transcribed/HTML: Max, B. and Mike B. 
 
  
July 11, 1961 
THE Chairman of the People's Republic of China and the Presidium of the Supreme 
People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, determined, in 
accordance with Marxism-Leninism and the principle of proletarian internationalism 
and on the basis of mutual respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and 
mutual benefit, and mutual assistance and support, to make every effort to further 
strengthen and develop the fraternal relations of friendship, co-operation and mutual 
assistance between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea, to jointly guard the security of the two peoples, and to safeguard 
and consolidate the peace of Asia and the world, and deeply convinced that the 
development and strengthening of the relations of friendship, co-operation and 
mutual assistance between the two countries accord not only with the fundamental 
interests of the two peoples but also with the interests of the peoples all over the 
world, have decided for this purpose to conclude the present Treaty and appointed 
as their respective plenipotentiaries: 
The Chairman of the People's Republic of China: Chou 
En-lai, Premier of the State Council of the People's 
Republic of China. 
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The Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea: Kim Il Sung, 
Premier of the Cabinet of the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea, 
Who, having examined each other's full powers and found them in good and due 
form, have agreed upon the the following:  
Article I 
The Contracting Parties will continue to make every effort to safeguard the peace of 
Asia and the world and the security of all peoples.  
Article II 
The Contracting Parties undertake jointly to adopt all measures to prevent aggression 
against either of the Contracting Parties by any state. In the event of one of the 
Contracting Parties being subjected to the armed attack by any state or several 
states jointly and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party 
shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal.  
Article III 
Neither Contracting Party shall conclude any alliance directed against the other 
Contracting Party or take part in any bloc or in any action or measure directed 
against the other Contracting Party .  
Article IV 
The Contracting Parties will continue to consult with each other on all important 
international questions of common interest to the two countries.  
Article V 
The Contracting Parties, on the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty, non-
interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and in the 
spirit of friendly co-operation, will continue to render each other every possible 
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economic and technical aid in the cause of socialist construction of the two countries 
and will continue to consolidate and develop economic, cultural, and scientific and 
technical co-operation between the two countries.  
Article VI 
The Contracting Parties hold that the unification of Korea must be realized along 
peaceful and democratic lines and that such a solution accords exactly with the 
national interests of the Korean people and the aim of preserving peace in the Far 
East.  
Article VII 
The present Treaty is subject to ratification and shall come into force on the day of 
exchange of instruments of ratification, which will take place in Pyongyang. The 
present Treaty will remain in force until the Contracting Parties agree on its 
amendment or termination. Done in duplicate in Peking on the eleventh day of July, 
nineteen sixty-one, in the Chinese and Korean languages, both texts being equally 
authentic.  
  
(Signed) 
CHOU EN-LAI 
Plenipotentiary of the 
People's Republic of China 
  
(Signed) 
KIM IL SUNG 
Plenipotentiary of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
Retrieved from: http://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/china_dprk.htm (accessed 
17.03.2011) 
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The four American defectors – and their sex-life: An anecdote on North Korean racial 
hygiene 
The North Korean population is perhaps unique in the world today as it is more or less totally 
homogenous. Everyone else is judged by the fact that they are not Korean and intermarriage 
or ―interbreeding‖ is unofficially forbidden. This is evident in the propaganda on the South 
Korean interracial marriages and the damage they are supposedly causing the Korean people. 
Another example of this is the story of the four American soldiers who defected to North 
Korea after the Korean War,
120
 Larry Allen Abshier, Jerry Wayne Parrish, James Joseph 
Dresnok and Charles Robert Jenkins were not allowed to find their own North Korean wives. 
Rather they were ―assigned‖ or ―given‖ foreign women. According to Jenkins‘ book Abshier 
married a Thai prostitute kidnapped from Macau, Dresnok married a Romanian woman 
kidnapped from Italy, Parrish married a Lebanese woman ―lured‖ to North Korea as described 
by Jenkins, and Jenkins married the kidnapped Japanese Hitomi Soga who later became his 
ticket out of North Korea as she was eventually repatriated to Japan. Actually, before their 
marriages all of the Americans were assigned ethnic Korean "cooks" or "maids" to live with 
them. These women had no children from before and were considered to be infertile. They 
were thus also ―allowed‖ and also expected to have sex with them. At one point Jenkins 
actually points out how one of his supervisors was angry with him for not having sufficient 
amounts of sex with his ―cook‖. Interracial sexual relations weren‘t a problem as long as it 
didn‘t cause any watering out of the Korean race. However, Abshier‘s supposedly infertile 
wife got pregnant and had to have an abortion. After this, the North Korean cooks were 
removed and the Americans were eventually ―given‖ their foreign brides. After his Romanian 
wife died, Dresnok later married a half Togolese, half Korean woman who was the daughter 
of a Togolese diplomat and a North Korean woman. Although being an ―illegal‖ half-breed 
she still could serve of some use as the new wife of Dresnok, and most importantly she 
obviously couldn‘t marry any North Korean and further contribute to the thinning out of the 
Korean blood. Also, the children of Dresnok are considered to be American although they 
have spent their whole life in Pyongyang, speak fluent Korean and broken English and their 
official papers are also stating that they are American rather than Korean.
121
 
 
                                                          
120
 See Jenkins (included in the sources) or the BBC documentary ‖Crossing the line‖ by Daniel Gordon 
121
 ―Crossing the Line‖ by Daniel  Gordon (Included in the sources) 
